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Abstract
Explicit deposit insurance is a crucial ingredient of modern finan-
cial safety nets. This paper investigates the effect of deposit insurance
adoption on individual bank leverage. Using a panel of banks across
117 countries during the period 1986-2011, I show that deposit in-
surance adoption pushes banks to increase significantly their leverage
by reducing their capital buffer. This increase in bank leverage then
translates into higher probability of insolvency. Most importantly, I
bring evidence that deposit insurance adoption has important compet-
itive effects: I show that large, systemic and highly leveraged banks
are unresponsive to deposit insurance adoption.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of excessive bank risk-taking is a crucial
issue since the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis. This research agenda has
received a lot of attention and many suspects have been identiﬁed. Among
them, excessive leverage is now rightly considered as one of the primary
causes of the Great Recession (Adrian and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier (2009)
and Acharya et al. (2012)). Highly leveraged ﬁnancial institutions increase
signiﬁcantly the risk of contagion as well as they have the potential to disrupt
durably the functioning of some ﬁnancial markets when facing unexpected
shocks. The credit supply may also shrink sharply in case of rapid and
simultaneous deleveraging process. On the other hand, recent work have
reaﬃrmed the prominent role of regulation in providing correct incentives to
banks. An intense debate concerning the adverse impact of state guarantees
has been revived by the massive bailouts and almost full guarantees provided
to the ﬁnancial industry after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Inter-
estingly, similar concerns arose when a large number of countries started to
implement an explicit deposit insurance scheme. These insurance schemes
suﬀer from the same moral hazard issue as state guarantees by giving banks
strong incentives to adopt risky behaviors thereafter. The general purpose
of this paper is to explore the relation between deposit insurance adoption
and bank leverage, paying particular attention to the possible heterogeneous
responses of banks.
The main beneﬁt from introducing a deposit insurance scheme is to pro-
tect small and presumably uninformed depositors against bank failures. Ac-
cordingly, deposit insurance should rule out bank runs and ineﬃcient liquida-
tion of proﬁtable projects (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). However, deposit
insurance adoption is likely to mitigate, if not eliminate, market discipline
by depositors as shown by Martínez-Peria and Schmukler (2002), Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2004) or Karas et al. (2013). In absence of actuarially
fair premia, deposit insurance poses a crucial moral hazard issue: it pro-
vides to banks strong incentives to increase their risk-taking to exploit the
put option value of deposit insurance (Merton (1977), Marcus and Shaked
(1984), Keeley (1990) and Pennacchi (2006)). In particular, deposit insur-
ance schemes with ﬂat premia should result in reducing signiﬁcantly bank
capital buﬀer (Bond and Crocker (1993)). Finally, if the deposit insurance
fund is unable to eﬃciently manage this build-up of excessive risk, the ulti-
mate eﬀect of deposit insurance might be to make depositors more exposed
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to bank failure.
This paper investigates the eﬀects of deposit insurance adoption on bank
risk-taking, and especially on bank leverage. More importantly, it explores
extensively the likely heterogeneity among banks’ responses. For this pur-
pose, I use a panel data set covering banks in 117 countries over the pe-
riod 1986-2011 together with a newly updated database on deposit insurance
schemes around the world. Deposit insurance adoption is found to increase
bank risk-taking by signiﬁcantly reducing bank capital buﬀer: the Capital-
to-Assets ratio of banks decreases by around 15% after the implementation
of deposit insurance scheme. This reduction of bank capital buﬀer translates
into higher insolvency risk: the distance-to-default of banks decreases by 15%
after deposit insurance adoption. However, these eﬀects are not uniformly
distributed across banks : large, systemic and initially highly leveraged banks
are unresponsive to deposit insurance adoption.
Previous research has investigated the adverse impact of deposit insurance
adoption on bank risk-taking (Kane (1989), Wheelock (1992), Wheelock and
Wilson (1995), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), and Laeven (2002)).
All these studies conclude that explicit deposit insurance can be related to
an increase in the probability of bank distress or a decrease in banking sta-
bility. Recently, DeLong and Saunders (2011) conﬁrm this increase in bank
risk-taking following deposit insurance adoption by studying the one that oc-
curred in the USA in 1933. Using internal loan ratings in Bolivia, Ioannidou
and Penas (2010) show that banks are more likely to originate riskier loans
after deposit insurance implementation. However, all these papers usually
focus on a speciﬁc country (mainly the USA) or a limited set of countries.1
When covering a large number of countries, they generally work at an ag-
gregate level.2 In this regard, the present paper does not consider aggregate
indicators of ﬁnancial stability but bank-level measurements of risk-taking:
it is among the ﬁrst to work at the bank-level with a large cross-country
data set. It is important because aggregate data may mask valuable micro
level patterns as the rest of the analysis will show. In addition, most of
the previous work focus on the impact of deposit insurance on asset risk or
volatility risk. In contrast the present paper investigates the consequences
of deposit insurance on bank capital buﬀer. This paper hence contributes
1DeLong and Saunders (2011), Ioannidou and Penas (2010) or Martínez-Peria and
Schmukler (2002)
2Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002),Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) or Beck
(2008) for instance
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to the literature by quantifying the impact of deposit insurance adoption on
individual bank risk of insolvency and by underlying the prominent role of
leverage in this process.
The adverse eﬀects of deposit insurance are not expected to be uniform
across banks. As underlined by Calomiris and White (1994), Demirguc-Kunt
and Kane (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008), deposit insurance adop-
tion should mainly beneﬁt to small banks. Similarly, systemic banks that
beneﬁt from implicit state guarantees (the too-big-to-fail hypothesis) should
not react to deposit insurance adoption because they escape market discipline
even before adoption. Finally, in absence of actuarially fair premia, well-
capitalized banks implicitly subsidize highly leveraged banks (Marcus and
Shaked (1984)). In addition, these well-capitalized banks have much more
room for substituting deposits to equity. We thus expect well-capitalized
banks to react more intensively than highly leveraged banks.
In this respect the most signiﬁcant contribution of this paper is to bring
evidence of this heterogeneity in banks’ response to deposit insurance adop-
tion. First, I ﬁnd that relative size and systemicity of banks are positively
and signiﬁcantly related to banks’ responsiveness to introduction of deposit
insurance. For the most systemic banks, i.e. those belonging to the top
10%/top 5% of the distribution within a country, deposit insurance adoption
has no signiﬁcant impact on leverage. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
view that systemically important banks already beneﬁt from implicit state
guarantees so that they are unaﬀected by the introduction of an explicit
system of deposit insurance. Accordingly, deposit insurance adoption could
have important competitive effects by removing the comparative advantage
of large and systemic banks and by improving competition on the banking
market. Second, I provide evidence that banks’ response to deposit insur-
ance adoption is an increasing function of their initial leverage so that only
the least leveraged banks react to implementation of explicit deposit guaran-
tees. The results indicates that the 20% most highly leveraged banks before
adoption do not change their capital buﬀer after implementation of deposit
insurance. We thus observe a convergence process in terms of capital buﬀer
across banks: the whole banking system is less well-capitalized and thus less
resilient to large shocks.
From a methodological point of view, this paper examines the eﬀect of
deposit insurance adoption by using essentially a differences-in-differences
methodology. Identiﬁcation relies on comparisons of the changes in risk-
taking over time between banks in countries that adopted a deposit insur-
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ance scheme at a given date and banks in countries that did not. There are
potential estimation concerns that are carefully addressed. First, a correct
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect relies on the common trends assumption. If the
trends of the treatment and control groups diﬀer in a systematic way, the
estimated treatment eﬀect is unidentiﬁed. I address this issue by adding lin-
ear and quadratic country-speciﬁc trends and by replicating the results on
a sample using a diﬀerent control group. Second, decision to adopt deposit
insurance is likely to be endogenous: an increase in bank risk-taking can sig-
niﬁcantly raise the demand for insurance by depositors and put governments
under pressure to adopt a deposit insurance scheme. I carefully consider this
reverse causality issue by running falsiﬁcation tests and placebo analysis.
Third and most importantly, I investigate the possibility that deposit insur-
ance adoption comes with simultaneous changes in ﬁnancial regulation or
with some country-speciﬁc aggregate shocks like banking crises. I check that
the results are not aﬀected by taking into account banking crisis episodes
and by controlling explicitly for changes in banking regulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section
oﬀers a brief presentation of deposit insurance schemes in which I discuss
the main costs and beneﬁts associated with the implementation of deposit
insurance scheme. In the third section, I present the data. I provide a short
graphical and statistical analysis in the fourth section. In the ﬁfth section,
I present the identiﬁcation strategy. I then set forth the results in the next
section. The seventh section consists in robustness checks. The last one
concludes.
2 Deposit Insurance Scheme: a Brief Presen-
tation
The ﬁrst deposit insurance scheme in the world was the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United States.3 The decision was taken
just after the wave of bank failures experienced during the Great Depression.
On June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt signs the Banking Act (also known
3In Norway there was a guarantee fund for savings banks with voluntary membership
as early as 1921 which then became mandatory in 1924, whereas a guarantee fund for
commercial banks was first introduced in 1938. However, Norway’s guarantee fund is not
considered a pure deposit insurance scheme so it had no official explicit deposit insurance
until 1961. (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) and EFDI 2006 report)
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as the Glass-Steagal Act) “creating a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and providing for the insurance of deposits in member banks of the Federal
Reserve System and also in nonmember banks under certain conditions.”.4
The temporary scheme was fully implemented on January 1, 1934 and the
Banking Act of 1935 established the FDIC as a permanent agency of the
government. The explicit goal was to raise the conﬁdence of the Americans
in the banking system by alleviating the disruptions caused by bank failures
and bank runs.5
Since then, a large number of countries have adopted an explicit deposit
insurance scheme as part of their regulatory framework.6 Establishment of
deposit insurance schemes has been largely promoted by IMF and World
Bank in the 90’s. Similarly, a deposit insurance scheme is now required to
become member of the European Union. These last years, an international
harmonization of these deposit insurance schemes has been initiated by the
International Association of Deposit Insurers and the European Forum of
Deposit Insurers, both founded in 2002. In 2010, 109 countries have an
explicit deposit insurance system.
Protecting small and unsophisticated depositors with deposit insurance
has the main advantage of ruling out bank runs and panics in case of ﬁ-
nancial stress or lack of conﬁdence in the banking system. When depositors
are uncertain about the liquidity position of their bank, the best individual
strategy is to run withdrawing their funds from bank. However, this strategy
is collectively ineﬃcient because it forces banks to stop proﬁtable projects
and to sell assets at ﬁre-sale prices, which may destabilize the entire bank-
ing system because of contagion (Allen and Gale (2000) and Diamond and
Rajan (2005)).7 These contagion phenomena can lead to a drastic reduc-
tion in the amount of loans oﬀered to the economy for an extended period
of time. Deposit insurance is a powerful tool to remove this uncertainty so
that there is no longer room for panics and ineﬃcient bank runs (Diamond
4http://archive.org/details/FullTextTheGlass-steagallActA.k.a.
TheBankingActOf1933
5See http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf for further details
on the history of the FDIC
6Countries having an explicit deposit insurance scheme and years of adoption are pre-
sented in table 1.
7Nonetheless, some work show that bank runs can be seen as a way to introduce some
contingency in demand deposit contract. Accordingly bank runs can be efficient. See Allen
and Gale (1998).
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and Dybvig (1983)). This is deﬁnitely the main beneﬁt from introducing
an explicit deposit insurance scheme as shown by the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Just after the Lehman fall, there were large doubts about the health of many
banks. But no banks really faced a bank run by non-institutional depositors,
excepting Northern Rock. It is also very likely that some bank liquidations
have been facilitated because depositors didn’t run even though failure was
almost certain.
However, deposit insurance schemes may have signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects.
It is often argued that deposit insurance reinforces moral hazard in banking:
existence of deposit insurances makes depositors less interested in monitoring
bank risk-taking. In other words, deposit insurance sensibly erodes market
discipline as evidenced by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004). Then, share-
holders and bank management can keep any excess proﬁts without having to
support the cost of excessive risk-taking on deposit rates (Merton (1977)).
This relaxation of market discipline is very likely concerning the bank lever-
age, i.e. the bank capital buﬀer. In presence of guarantees, creditors are much
less concerned by the capital cushion of banks. Banks can thus improve the
return on equity by increasing their leverage. Overall, there are strong pre-
sumptions that introduction of a deposit insurance scheme may foster bank
risk-taking if deposit insurance premia are not adequately priced.8
Accordingly, most of deposit insurance schemes are designed to limit these
perverse incentives. First, there often exists upper bounds on the amount
covered (100 000 € in the euro zone for instance). These limits make possi-
ble to discriminate between small, fragile, and uninformed depositors from
large depositors who are supposed to have higher ability to monitor banks
as shown by Ioannidou and Penas (2010). Also, many deposit insurance
schemes incorporate a coinsurance mechanism. In this case, depositors will
have to support a small share of the losses in case of bank failure. Another
way to curb the moral hazard related to deposit insurance can be to im-
plement risk-based premium rather than flat premium: the more risky the
bank strategy, the higher the premium the bank have to pay. But it requires
to very accurately assess the ex ante risk of banks, which can be diﬃcult
8That is exactly what Keeley (1990) explained in the introduction of his famous paper:
“It has long been recognized that a fixed rate deposit insurance system, such as the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s), or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation’s ( FSLIC’s) can pose a moral hazard for excessive risk taking. The reason is
that banks or thrifts can borrow at or below the risk-free rate by issuing insured deposits
and then investing the proceeds in risky assets with higher expected yields.”
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(Acharya et al. (2010)). More generally, deposit insurances schemes have
various features that may induce some heterogeneity in the eﬀects of these
guarantee funds on bank risk-taking.9
To summarize, the main beneﬁt associated with deposit insurance is to
rule out ineﬃcient and very destructive bank runs. This is why deposit
insurance scheme has been largely promoted across the world by various in-
stitutions like the IMF or the World Bank. However, in providing guarantees
on the liabilities of banks, it can fuel bank risk-taking and make more likely
to experience bank failures. The next sections aim to assess precisely these
cost associated with deposit insurance adoption, namely the increase in risk-
taking following introduction of deposit insurance through the reduction of
capital buﬀer.
3 Data
3.1 Sources and Construction
This paper uses two distinct databases. The ﬁrst one is the Fitch IBCA’s
BankScope database widely recognized as the most important banking database
in the world. It provides detailed balance sheets of banks in most countries
over the last twenty years. Second, I construct a new data set by review-
ing and updating the existing databases about deposit insurance schemes.
Especially, for each country I collect rigorously the year of adoption of the
deposit insurance scheme. The data, the sources and the exact procedures
implemented are described extensively in the appendix A.
The restrictions imposed on the data set are also detailed in the appendix
A. In particular, I choose to keep the largest set of countries as possible by
including those having already adopted a deposit insurance scheme before
banking data started to be collected (like USA or Germany for instance). The
estimates of the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption should not be aﬀected
directly by observations from these countries. But these observations enlarge
the control group used in the estimation process helping to smooth its size
and its composition over time. To strengthen the validity of the results, I
also perform the regressions on a sample restricted to countries adopting a
9But collecting time-varying data about these features is a hard task. See Appendix A
for further discussion on this issue
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deposit insurance during the period covered.10 I will come back to this issue
when discussing my estimation strategy.
Ultimately, the main sample consists in a database with bank-level bal-
ance sheet information over the years 1986-2011 for 117 countries. For 68 of
them, a deposit insurance scheme is implemented during a period for which
we have bank balance sheet information. The database contains 207 060
bank-year observations and 18 825 unique banks.11 On average a bank has
12 years of observations, with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of
16 years. Among these 117 countries, 86 have an explicit deposit insurance
scheme. For each country, the exact year of adoption and the number of
banks are presented in table 1.
I face two important issues with this sample. The main diﬃculty arises
from the increasing coverage over time: the number of banks within a coun-
try and the number of countries reported in BankScope increases sensibly
over time, especially during the ﬁrst years i.e. between 1986 and 1999. This
is an important weakness that can aﬀect the results and it is an important
motivation for using bank ﬁxed-eﬀects. Second, as explained in the previous
section, there are some heterogeneity in the deposit insurance characteris-
tics across countries (upper bound, coinsurance mechanism, nature of the
premia...). Unfortunately, I cannot control explicitly for these time-varying
features by lack of information as explained in the appendix A. I can only
control for the time-invariant or slow-moving dimension of these characteris-
tics with bank ﬁxed-eﬀects. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to
evaluate the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance that is independent of
the characteristics of the deposit insurance schemes. I argue that adoption
itself is likely to have the largest eﬀect on bank risk-taking while the various
features may only impact marginally this initial adverse eﬀect.
3.2 Bank Risk Measurements
This paper aims to provide a new look on the eﬀects of a speciﬁc regulatory
change –the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme– on bank risk-taking,
101986-2011
11First, note that 9 935 (almost 54% of the sample) are US banks (112 286 obs.) and
2 215 (almost 13% of the sample) are German banks (27 762 obs.). Second, among these
207 060 bank-year observation, 1 477 have missing log-transformed risk proxy because
of negative value. I keep them because I run robustness check using risk-proxy without
log-transformation.
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with a particular focus on the leverage. Before presenting the indicators
used, I discuss brieﬂy the data limitations. First, the database used consists
in balance-sheet of banks, and only few of these banks are listed.12 Hence,
market-based measurements are not used in this paper and only balance sheet
measurements of risk are taken into consideration. Second, Tier 1 and Total
risk-weighted capital ratios are missing for almost all banks from countries
other than USA.13 Hence the leverage ratio used in this paper is the Capital-
to-Assets ratio, i.e. the ratio of equity over total unweighted assets. But
there are also more fundamental reasons to focus on the Capital-to-Assets
ratio.
While a preference toward a regulation based on risk-weighted leverage
measures has been observed these last twenty years, the recent ﬁnancial cri-
sis has also stressed the importance to monitor raw leverage ratios. For
instance, Basel III agreements will introduce “a simple, transparent, non-
risk based leverage ratio that is calibrated to act as a credible supplementary
measure to the risk based capital requirements”.14 This ratio will help to
“constrain the build-up of leverage in the banking sector, helping avoid desta-
bilizing deleveraging processes which can damage the broader financial system
and the economy” by introducing “additional safeguards against model risk
and measurement error”. The recent crisis has shed light on the limits of the
regulation based on risk-weights (Acharya et al. (2012)) and regulators now
recognize the importance to also monitor raw leverage ratio of banks.
I also investigate the eﬀect of deposit insurance on individual probability
of default by using the (log of) z-score as dependent variable. This increas-
ingly popular measure of bank risk-taking15 is computed as the sum of the
Capital-to-Assets Ratio (CARt) and the average Return on Average Asset
(ROAA) over the standard deviation of ROAA for a given period :
Zt =
µ(ROAAt) + CARt
σ(ROAAt)
One important advantage of the z-score is to combine the leverage risk
with two additional dimensions of risk: the proﬁtability and the volatility of
returns. Formally, the z-score measures the individual probability of insol-
12Only 904 banks corresponding to 10 823 obs. are listed.
13Tier 1 ratio is missing for 77 292 observations over 94 774 (81%)
14http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf
15Beck (2008),Laeven and Levine (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Beck
et al. (2011) for instance
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vency (Boyd and Runkle (1993)).16 It reﬂects the distance-to-default i.e. the
number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROAA has to fall for the bank
to become insolvent for a given leverage ratio. The higher the z-score, the
lower the risk of default. Additional information about the z-score can be
found in appendix.17
4 Graphical and Statistical Analysis
Before discussing the identiﬁcation strategy and the econometric results, I
present some graphical evidence that deposit insurance adoption can be sus-
pected to increase both leverage and probability of default. I start by pre-
senting the evolution of both indicators across time. It is important to ﬁgure
out what is the global trend of these outcome variables because identiﬁcation
of the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption relies on time-series comparisons.
In ﬁgures 1 and 2 , I plot the evolution of the average and the median
values of both risk measurements. The sample is restricted to banks facing
deposit insurance adoption to be more in line with the econometric analysis:
it excludes banks that are not used to identify the eﬀect of adoption. This
restriction is mainly motivated by the fact that BankScope suﬀers from an
artiﬁcial trend in coverage that could distort the results. We observe that
both the Capital-to-Assets ratio and the log of z-score tend to increase over
time (or at least to be ﬂat). For instance, the average (median) value of the
Capital-to-Assets ratio raises from 10% (6%) in 1990 to 15% (11%) in 2002
before stabilizing around 13% (11%). The only notable exception concerns
the average Capital-to-Assets ratio during the years 2002-2005 and 2009-2011
during which it is slightly decreasing. From these ﬁgures, we conclude that
the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption that we capture in this paper –a
downward shift of both the capital buﬀer and the distance-to-default– is at
odds with the global trend observed these last 20 years.
16Defining insolvency as the state in which capital is fully depletes by negative returns
on asset, i.e. CARt+ROAAt < 0, the probability of insolvency is defined as P [ROAAt <
−CARt]. Then a simple application of the Bienaymé-Chebyshev inequality provides an
upper bound of this probability (with strict equality if ROAAt is normally distributed) :
P [ROAAt < −CARt] ≤ Z
−2
t
17To make both risk measurements homogeneous, I multiply the log of z-score by -1
such that lower values of log of z-score are now associated with higher insolvency risk.
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By comparing the distribution of both the log of z-score and the Capital-
to-Assets ratio before and after deposit insurance adoption, we can now ﬁg-
ure out more precisely the possible eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption. We
want to know whether we observe a systematic shift in the distribution after
deposit insurance implementation that could indicate an increase in bank
risk-taking. Note that we continue to restrict the sample to banks having
observations before and after the introduction of deposit insurance adoption.
The ﬁgures 3 and 4 represent these two distributions. In both cases, we ob-
serve clearly a left shift in the distribution of risk after the implementation of
deposit insurance. This indicates a decrease in both the Capital-to-Assets ra-
tio and the distance-to-default, that is to say an increase in bank risk-taking.
For instance in ﬁgure 3, we have much less very highly capitalized banks
(i.e. those with a Capital-to-Assets ratio above 20%) and much more highly
under-capitalized banks (i.e. those below 10%) after deposit insurance adop-
tion. Figures 1 and 2 in appendix show the kernel density estimates of these
distributions. Kernel density estimates have the advantages of being smooth
and of being independent of the choice of origin. The previous conclusions
are entirely conﬁrmed by these ﬁgures.
However, when there are much more observations per banks after adop-
tion than before, these distributions are biased. To overcome this issue, I
compute the average value before and after adoption for both risk-taking in-
dicators. Then, I keep only one observation per bank and per period, i.e. one
observation before and one observation after adoption, and I plot the distri-
butions of these average values. These are the ﬁgures 4 and 5. The previous
conclusions are strengthened by this additional restriction. We continue to
observe a shift toward the left of the distribution after deposit insurance
adoption denoting an increase in risk-taking. In the ﬁgures 3 and 4 in ap-
pendix, I present the distribution of the diﬀerence in the average values of
risk before and after adoption for each banks. Distributions with a large
mass of negative values would be evidence in favor of the risk-shifting ef-
fect of deposit insurance adoption. It would indicate that a large fraction of
banks have lower average Capital-to-Assets ratio or lower average distance-
to-default after adoption. This is exactly what I ﬁnd: both distributions are
highly skewed toward negative values.
Finally, I report descriptive statistics for the leverage and the distance-
to-default before and after deposit insurance adoption in table 3. For both
measurements, we have additional evidence that deposit insurance is likely
to have a negative eﬀect on risk-taking. The average (resp. median) Capital-
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to-Assets ratio decreases by 6.7% (9.1%) and the average (resp. median)
log of z-score decreases by 5.7% (5.9%). Thresholds corresponding to the
25th and 75th percentile also denote an increase in risk-taking. According to
these simple descriptive statistics, banks are less capitalized and more likely
to default after the adoption of deposit guarantees.
In conclusion, this graphical and statistical analysis oﬀers preliminary
evidence that deposit insurance adoption is very likely to induce an increase
in both the leverage ratio and the probability of default. To conﬁrm this
intuition, I conduct an econometric analysis. I explain the identiﬁcation
strategy and I present the results in the next section.
5 Identification Strategy
The primary goal of this paper is to assess over a large panel of banks the
impact of deposit guarantees on bank leverage. The identiﬁcation uses essen-
tially a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences methodology. From the database on Deposit
Insurance Schemes, I construct a dummy taking the value of one after a de-
posit insurance was introduced in a given country and zero before. This is
the main independent variable of interest. Deﬁne tˆj as the year in which a
deposit insurance has been implemented in country j gives :
DIj, t =
{
1 if t ≧ tˆj
0 if t < tˆj
The baseline regression performed is the following :
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t (5.1)
where i denote the bank, t the year and j the country. Riski,j,t stands
for the diﬀerent risk-taking proxies considered. Xi,t,j is the vector of control
variables, θt are year ﬁxed-eﬀects and ui are bank ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard
errors are clustered at the country-level. The main coeﬃcient of interest is β,
the eﬀect of introducing a deposit insurance scheme on bank risk-taking. The
identiﬁcation of β relies on the comparison of the changes in risk-taking over
time between banks in countries that adopted a deposit insurance scheme at a
given date and banks in countries that did not. The staggered passage of the
deposit insurance means that the control group is not restricted to countries
that never adopt a deposit insurance scheme. In fact, the identiﬁcation
implicitly takes as the control group all banks operating in countries that do
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not adopt a deposit insurance scheme at time t, even if they have already
adopted a deposit insurance or will adopt one later on.
Compared with previous work, this paper focuses on the within-bank ef-
fect of deposit insurance adoption. Using bank ﬁxed-eﬀects ui has several
advantages. First it allows to exploit substantial additional variability by
adding time-series dimensions of the data. It is also a way to control for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level.18 Recent work
have stressed that ﬁxed-eﬀects explain most of the variation in leverage, for
both corporate ﬁrms and banks (Lemmon et al. (2008) and Gropp and Heider
(2010)).
But, an important beneﬁt from using bank ﬁxed-eﬀects is more directly
related to the issue investigated. Deposit insurance adoption can have two
distinct eﬀects on bank risk-taking and it is important to consider them
separately. First, it can increase risk-taking for existing banks: this is the
intensive margin eﬀect. Second, it can promote the entry of riskier banks:
this is the extensive margin eﬀect. Using bank ﬁxed-eﬀects permits to focus
on the intensive margin eﬀect. Naturally, distinguishing these two eﬀects is
important. But this approach is even essential given the increasing coverage
of BankScope. From 1985 to 2000, the number of banks reported in a given
country and the number of countries covered tends to increase continuously
in the sample. It is thus very diﬃcult to assess the extensive margin eﬀect
because the results could be largely driven by these artiﬁcial changes in
coverage. To my knowledge, this paper is one of the ﬁrst to consider seriously
this issue.19
Other time-varying factors could also aﬀect the choice of banks leverage.
If these factors vary precisely at the time of deposit insurance adoption, it
could produce spurious correlations. To overcome this issue, it is possible to
include time-varying control variables. However, any covariates included as
control variable must be unaﬀected by the treatment (Roberts and Whited
(2011)). This condition severely limits the possible covariates to include.
For instance, size is generally considered as an important determinant of
18Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) detail various bank-level or country-level time-invariant
differences that are accounted for by using fixed-effects. Among them are accounting
practices, balance sheet representation and domestic regulatory adjustment. As explained
previously, in the present situation it also controls for any time-invariant differences in the
feature of the deposit insurance schemes.
19The recent paper by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) also shed light on this important
issue.
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leverage structure but it is also very likely to be aﬀected by deposit insurance
adoption. Hence, I only consider a restricted set of control variables and I
report all the results both with and without these covariates.20
The ﬁrst control is the real GDP annual growth rate as the business cycles
are one of the major source of ﬂuctuation in the riskiness of bank’s balance
sheet. Then the inflation rate is included in the set of controls as a traditional
determinant of bank risk-taking. In order to control for the degree of ﬁnancial
development, the logarithm of GDP per capita is included in the vector of
controls. They are all obtained from the World Bank statistics over the
period 1985-2011. Moreover, an important debate exists about the impact
of concentration on bank risk-taking.21 In any case, market structures like
concentration are largely considered as an important determinant of bank
risk-taking. Using market shares on the deposits market, an HHI index is
constructed for each country, measuring the concentration on the deposit
market.22 Recall that
HHIt =
n∑
i=0
(MarketSharei, t)
2
where n is the total number of banks on a speciﬁc market. A higher HHI
index denotes a more concentrated deposits market. Finally, the inclusion of
year ﬁxed-eﬀects in the regressions allow to control for aggregate ﬂuctuations.
In the next section, I will present and discuss the results.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline specification
In this section, I present and discuss the results from the baseline speciﬁ-
cation (5.1). A negative and signiﬁcant value for βˆ means that on average
banks tend to be more leveraged after the introduction of a deposit insur-
ance scheme than before. Results are reported in table 4. The ﬁrst two
columns report regressions with only year ﬁxed-eﬀects and bank-ﬁxed ef-
fects. Each regression is estimated with robust standard errors clustered
20Regressions using a larger set of covariates, notably bank level controls, can be found
in the appendix.
21See Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) for an overview
22Correlation between HHI on the loans market and HHI on the deposits market is 0.95.
It doesn’t make any differences to use the one or the other.
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at the country-level to correct for within-country serial correlation (Petersen
(2009)). Nonetheless, correct estimation of standard errors is challenging in a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework. This is why I also implement the method
proposed in Bertrand et al. (2004) to address serial correlation issues in the
robustness checks section.
The ﬁrst two columns of table 4 show the basic impact of deposit in-
surance adoption on bank risk-taking without any controls. We observe an
important and a very signiﬁcant negative eﬀect, meaning that banks tend to
increase their leverage after the implementation of deposit insurance scheme.
I then add the set of controls variables. The coeﬃcients on deposit insurance
adoption keep the same sign and magnitude, as well as they remain highly
signiﬁcant for both risk proxies.
There are diﬀerent ways for interpreting the economic signiﬁcance of these
coeﬃcients. First the eﬀect can be interpreted directly in terms of percentage
change. Concerning the Capital-to-Assets ratio, the estimated coeﬃcient
indicates that the leverage of banks tends to decrease by 15.33% after deposit
insurance adoption.23 In the case of the log of z-score, adopting a deposit
insurance scheme tends to reduce the z-score by 16.52%.24
It is also possible to interpret these results in a diﬀerent way. Irrespec-
tive of the percentage changes in the level of risk-taking reﬂected by these
two proxies, it is worth to know how these changes in risk-taking following
deposit insurance adoption compare to “natural” ﬂuctuations of risk-taking.
Precisely, I want to relate the magnitude of these eﬀects to the sample within
standard deviations of the two risk-taking measurements. In table 3, I report
the overall, between and within standard deviation of both the log of z-score
and the Capital-to-Assets ratio computed on the sample of banks on which
the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption is estimated. It appears that the
implementation of a deposit insurance scheme produces an increase in risk-
taking corresponding to 31.79% of one sample within standard deviation for
the Capital-to-Assets ratio and 44.73% of one sample within standard devi-
ation for the log of z-score. 25
23This is the magnitude of the effect evaluated at the mean of the sample on which
the deposit insurance dummy is estimated: −0.0230/0.15. The magnitude of the effect
becomes 20.91% when evaluated at the mean of the full sample: −0.0230/0.11.
24This value is computed as follow 100·[exp(c∗− 1
2
·v∗(c∗))−1], where c∗ is the estimated
coefficient and v∗(c∗) is the estimated variance of c∗ as suggested by Kennedy (1981).
25These are the in-sample magnitudes of the risk-shifting effect of deposit insurance.
When comparing with the within standard deviation computed over the entire sample
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These results hence suggest that there exists a negative and signiﬁcant
correlation between the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and
the bank ﬁnancial soundness. This relation appears to be mainly driven by a
rise in the leverage ratio: we capture an increase of 15% in the leverage ratio
of banks after deposit insurance adoption. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
literature (Keeley (1990), Berger et al. (1995), Saunders and Wilson (1999),
or Acharya et al. (2011)).
Bank creditors are particularly concerned by monitoring the amount of
equity held by the bank. First it is the capital cushion that is intended to
absorb unexpected losses: the lower the Capital-to-Assets ratio, the more
fragile the bank in case of unexpected shocks. Second, a higher level of
Capital-to-Assets ratio signals that banks has more skin in the game and thus
less incentives to make risky investment. In presence of deposit insurance,
depositors become much less concerned by the bank Capital-to-Assets ratio
because of the guarantees oﬀered (as shown by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(2004) or Nier and Baumann (2006)). After deposit insurance adoption,
banks being no longer charged for excessive risk-taking, shareholders and
management have strong incentives to reduce their Capital-to-Assets ratio
to increase the return on equity for a given return on assets. The adverse
impact of deposit insurance on bank leverage is actually largely recognized:
“Indeed, the entire system of capital regulation is the result of the recognition
that incentives to take excessive risk arise as a result of demand deposit and
other elements of the safety net of banks.” (Admati et al. (2011)).
Compared with the previous work of Gropp and Vesala (2004), this pa-
per isolates the intensive margin eﬀect, that is to say the change in leverage
for existing banks. It is crucial because the identiﬁcation is otherwise con-
taminated by the artiﬁcial changes in BankScope coverage. Moreover, their
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of deposit insurance relies on time-series variation
in only 4 European countries while I am using variation in deposit insurance
scheme in almost 54 countries. This ﬁnding also challenges the results es-
tablished by Gropp and Heider (2010). The authors ﬁnd that bank leverage
is insensitive to deposit insurance coverage. Two reasons may explain these
contrasting results. First, they focus on large banks of developed countries
while I am working mainly with banks in developing countries irrespective of
(and not just on the sample of banks on which the effect of deposit insurance adoption is
estimated), the out-sample magnitudes become much larger: 49.59% (0.0230/04638) for
the Capital-to-Assets ratio and 60.94% (0.1797/0.2949) for the log of z-score.
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their size. Second, their identiﬁcation strategy is based on variations in de-
posit insurance coverage across countries. It is possible that the introduction
of an explicit deposit insurance scheme sends an important signal to deposi-
tors and banks whereas variability in deposit insurance coverage is likely to
be less noticeable explaining why these variations generate less diﬀerences in
banks behavior.
Overall these results exhibit some evidence that adopting a deposit in-
surance scheme fosters risk-taking by reducing the capital buﬀer of banks by
15%. Before turning to the most important part of this paper investigating
the heterogeneous eﬀects of deposit insurance adoption, I want to discuss
three potential identiﬁcation issues.
6.2 Tests of Identification Strategy
The results established in the previous section seem to indicate that deposit
insurance adoption makes banks much more leveraged. Nonetheless, the
identiﬁcation strategy summarized in equation (5.1) may suﬀer from three
problems. The ﬁrst one concerns the common trends assumption: to conclude
that the changes in leverage observed are caused by deposit insurance adop-
tion, we have to assume that in the absence of deposit insurance adoption,
the leverage ratio and the distance-to-default would have evolved similarly
between treatment and control groups.
Second, the identiﬁcation strategy may face a reverse causality issue.
Indeed, we could suspect that bank leverage starts to increase before deposit
insurance adoption. This increase in bank leverage can then raise the demand
for insurance by depositors and force the government to adopt a guarantee
scheme. In this case, the coeﬃcient estimated by equation (5.1) captures the
eﬀect of an increase in bank risk-taking on the probability to adopt a deposit
insurance rather than vice versa.
Third and most importantly, identiﬁcation may suﬀer from a simultane-
ity bias. It is possible that we also capture the eﬀect of another change
in banking regulation occurring at the same time as the deposit insurance
implementation. Similarly, it is hard to separate out the eﬀects of country-
speciﬁc shocks contemporaneous with the deposit insurance adoption from
the eﬀects of the deposit insurance adoption itself. In particular, countries
may adopt a deposit insurance scheme precisely at the time where they suﬀer
from a severe ﬁnancial crisis. To address this issue, I control explicitly for
the eﬀects of regulatory changes and those of banking crises by using the
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data from Abiad et al. (2010) and Valencia and Laeven (2008).
6.2.1 Common Trends Assumption
It is quite diﬃcult to test the common trends assumption, especially in a
context in which the implementations of the law are staggered over time.
One immediate solution relies on the inclusion of country-year interactions
terms. While completely nonrestrictive, such a speciﬁcation is not possible
in the current framework.26 However, the inclusion of country-speciﬁc trends
in the baseline regressions is an alternative solution allowing the outcome
of treatment and control groups to follow diﬀerent trends in a limited but
potentially revealing way (Angrist and Pischke (2008)).
Since I do not have any prior about the shape of these potential country-
speciﬁc trends, quadratic trends are also included in the regressions allowing
for a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation. In this case, the eﬀect of deposit insur-
ance is identiﬁed from a break in the pattern of bank’s risk-taking that is
distinguishable from a smooth quadratic. The regressions estimated are the
following:
Riski,j,t = αi + β ·DIj,t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui +
∑
j
τlin. · Trendj,t + ǫi,j,t (6.1)
Riski,j,t = αi+β ·DIj,t+γ ·Xi,j,t+θt+ui+
∑
j
τlin. ·Trendj,t+
∑
j
τquad. ·Trend
2
j,t+ǫi,j,t
(6.2)
Results are reported in tables 6 and 7. All the previous conclusions remain
largely unchanged even after taking into account country-speciﬁc trends. The
deposit insurance variable keeps the expected signs in both regressions and
the signiﬁcance remains the same. While slightly lower, the magnitude of
the eﬀect is mostly unchanged for both measures. To sum up, controlling
for country-speciﬁc trends does not alter the initial ﬁndings. An alternative
way to check the sensitivity of the results to the common trends assumption
26Because it is no longer possible to estimate the deposit insurance dummy which is
country-year specific.
6 RESULTS 20
consists in using a diﬀerent control group. Finding diﬀerent results should
be a source of concerns. I run such a sensitivity test in the robustness checks
section and the conclusions are unaltered. It is thus unlikely that treatment
and control groups experience diﬀerent evolutions of leverage ratio in such
a way that it could contaminate our identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of deposit
insurance adoption.
6.2.2 Reverse Causality
Another potential issue is that we cannot exclude a priori that deposit in-
surance schemes are implemented in a country after bank risk-taking starts
to increase signiﬁcantly. A change in bank leverage observed by depositors
can increase pressures on government to adopt a system of deposit guar-
antees. Alternatively, growing international competition may force banks
to take more risk and then to lobby for implementing a deposit insurance
scheme preserving them from paying excessive deposit rates. In both case,
the baseline identiﬁcation strategy may suﬀer from a reverse causality issue.
To rule out this possibility, I implement a falsiﬁcation test.27
For this purpose, I replace the main deposit insurance dummy variable
by a set of dummy variables taking the value of one exactly τ years after or
τ years before the true adoption :{
DI
Before
j, tˆj −τ
= 1 if t = tˆj − τ
DI
After
j, tˆj +τ
= 1 if t = tˆj + τ
where tˆj denotes the year of adoption in country j. Then I run the following
regression :
Riski,j,t = αi+β ·DIj,t+
6∑
τ=1
λτ ·DI
Before
j, tˆj−τ
+
7∑
τ=1
λτ ·DI
After
j, tˆj+τ
+γ ·Xi,j,t+θt+ui+ǫi,j,t (6.3)
With this speciﬁcation, it is possible to assess whether an increase in risk-
taking is observed in the years preceding the deposit insurance adoption. In
this case, some dummy variables for the year before the true adoption should
have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Finding such an eﬀect
would be symptomatic of potential reverse causality.
27Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Roberts and Whited (2011). See Gruber and Hunger-
man (2008) for an application.
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The results can be found in table 8. The ﬁrst two columns shows the
results from a speciﬁcation in which the reference year is set to be the year
preceding adoption.28 We observe that the dummy variables for the years pre-
ceding adoption are never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and have very low
magnitude compared to the one of the eﬀect previously found. In contrast,
all the dummy variables associated with the year following adoption present
a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect. These results indicates that both
the leverage ratio and the distance-to-default have regular patterns before
adoption: we cannot ﬁnd any jump in bank risk-taking before adoption.29
The leverage ratio or the distance-to-default start to decrease signiﬁcantly
only after the adoption.
The next two columns investigates a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation. Now,
I include a dummy for all the periods around the adoption year.30 This
speciﬁcation is more in line with those from Autor (2003) or Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003). Additionally, I perform a placebo analysis in simulating
“false” deposit insurance adoption. The exact method and the results are
presented in the appendix B. The conclusions remain the same: there is
no evidence that risk-taking starts to increase signiﬁcantly before adoption.
These speciﬁcation checks tend to reject the possibility of reverse causation
driving the baseline results.
6.2.3 Simultaneity
The most important concerns about the identiﬁcation strategy relates to the
possibility that deposit insurance adoption comes with other changes in ﬁnan-
cial regulation or with some country-speciﬁc aggregate shocks like banking
crises (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
(2002)). To tackle this issue, I use the data collected by IMF researchers
(Abiad et al. (2010) and Valencia and Laeven (2008)) concerning banking
crises and ﬁnancial reforms across the world. The banking crisis database
provides the starting date and the ending date of 42 crisis episodes in 37
28The graphical representation of this specification can be found in figures 7 and 8.
29A source of concerns could be the downward trend that we can observed by looking
at figures 7 and 8. In both cases, the risk-taking tends to slightly increase with time.
However, we clearly identify a significant break in this downward trend exactly at the
time of adoption: bank risk-taking increases much more than what we could have expected
according to this long term trend.
30Note that the reference year is no longer explicitly defined.
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countries. I thus construct a dummy variable Crisisj, t taking the value of
one for each crisis episode. The ﬁnancial reforms database covers 91 coun-
tries over 1973-2005. It provides various index of ﬁnancial reforms including
an index relative to prudential regulations and supervision of the banking
sector which are the kind of reforms the most likely to aﬀect the leverage
ratio of banks. This indicator sums up four distinct dimensions and takes
values between 0 and 3 in which higher values denote more regulated banking
sectors.31
Based on these two indicators, I run the following regressions aiming to
control for simultaneous changes in regulation and banking crises:
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω · Crisisj, t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t (6.4)
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·Reformj, t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t (6.5)
We expect a positive coeﬃcient for the ﬁnancial reform indicators and a
negative coeﬃcient for the banking crisis dummy. In the case in which the ef-
fect of deposit insurance partially captures the eﬀect of simultaneous changes
in regulation and banking crises we should observe a large reduction in the
magnitude (and possibly in the signiﬁcance) of the coeﬃcient for the deposit
insurance dummy. Results of theses regressions are presented in table 9. The
ﬁrst two columns replicates the baseline results. The third and the fourth
columns present results including the banking crisis dummy while the ﬁfth
and the sixth columns show the results after adding the banking supervision
index. In both case, the coeﬃcient for each indicator is insigniﬁcant. Above
all, their economic signiﬁcance is very small: the magnitude of the coeﬃ-
cient associated to banking crisis and banking supervision is almost 10 times
smaller than the coeﬃcient of deposit insurance adoption. In columns 7 and
8, I replace the banking supervision index by the overall ﬁnancial reforms
index.32 Results indicates that ﬁnancial liberalization seems to be positively
related to bank risk-taking but the inclusion of this indicator in the set of
regressors is without any eﬀect on the estimated impact of deposit insurance
adoption. Finally, in columns 9 and 10 I present results of regressions using
both indicators simultaneously.
31Note that the limited time coverage of this indicator reduces the sample size. To keep
sample size similar across regressions, I assign the value of the year 2005 to the financial
reform indicator for the years 2006-2011.
32This index aggregates seven dimensions to obtain a single liberalization index for each
economy and for each year.
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The most important message from these regressions is that the economic
and statistical signiﬁcance of deposit insurance adoption is only marginally
aﬀected by inclusion of these indicators: the maximum diminution corre-
sponds to 9% of the magnitude of the eﬀect while statistical signiﬁcance is
unchanged. Finally note that bias related to simultaneous changes in bank-
ing regulation, if present, is likely to be a downward bias. These last twenty
years, the regulatory framework of banking activities has been more directed
toward higher capital ratio than the opposite as evidenced by the successive
implementation of Basel I and Basel II.33 It is even possible to think that such
simultaneous regulatory changes could be designed to mitigate the perverse
eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption. Hence, regulatory changes implemented
at the same time as deposit insurance are likely to induce an increase in the
Capital-to-Assets ratio going against the expected eﬀect of deposit insurance
adoption.
To summarize, the identiﬁcation strategy does not seem to suﬀer from
simultaneity: even after taking into account banking crisis and changes
in banking regulations, the eﬀect of deposit insurance remains mostly un-
changed. After having considered carefully the potential biases that could
aﬀect the baseline results, we can turn to the most important contribution
of this paper.
6.3 An Analysis of the Heterogeneity of Banks’ Re-
sponse : the Competitive Effects of Deposits In-
surance Adoption
The results presented in the previous sections demonstrate that deposit insur-
ance adoption adversely impacts banks’ capital buﬀer. The theory predicts
that deposit insurance should relax the market discipline from depositors.
Accordingly, banks have strong incentives to adopt more risky behaviors be-
cause creditors no longer price eﬃciently these risky strategies. In particular,
we expect that banks would operate with much lower Capital-to-Assets ratio
in presence of deposit insurance. Consistent with these predictions, I ﬁnd
that deposit insurance adoption reduces the capital buﬀer of banks by 15%.
This increase in the leverage ratio of banks translates into lower distance-to-
33At least in the countries on which the effect of deposit insurance adoption is estimated,
that is to say mainly developing countries. This is exactly what we observed in the figures
1 and 2
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default, that is to say higher probability of failure.
However the eﬀect identiﬁed previously is an average effect across the
whole sample of banks and it is quite plausible that adopting a deposit in-
surance should have heterogeneous eﬀects on banks along various dimensions.
For instance, number of authors suggest that deposit insurance should bene-
ﬁt mainly to small banks (Calomiris and White (1994), Demirguc-Kunt and
Kane (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) for instance). From the reg-
ulators perspective, it is very important to improve its knowledge about the
heterogeneity in banks’ response and to identify which banks react the most
to deposit insurance adoption. The present section investigates these likely
heterogeneous responses of banks.
The main conclusion is that deposit insurance has important competi-
tive eﬀects on the banking industry: adoption of deposit insurance scheme
seems to beneﬁt mostly to small, non systemic and well-capitalized banks.
First, I ﬁnd that banks’ response to the introduction of deposit guarantees
is more important for banks with small initial market shares. Similarly, the
response of banks to deposit insurance adoption is negatively related to the
initial systemic importance of banks. I thus do not ﬁnd any eﬀect for the
largest and the most systemic banks. In both cases, these ﬁndings can be
explained by the fact that large and systemic banks beneﬁted from implicit
state guarantees before deposit insurance adoption. Therefore, they already
escaped market discipline and they do not take advantage from adoption of
an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Second, I show that bank responsive-
ness is negatively related to their initial leverage leading to a convergence
process among banks: those which are initially highly leveraged appear to be
insensitive to deposit insurance adoption. This second features of deposit in-
surance adoption could be related to capital requirement : banks with a high
initial leverage have much less room to increase it before capital constraint
binds.
These results point out that deposit insurance adoption does not generate
a build-up of fragility among a small set of banks, be they initially highly
leveraged, relatively large or too-systemic-to-fail. However, they also indi-
cate that the whole domestic banking industry tends to be less adequately
capitalized after the implementation of deposit insurance.
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6.3.1 The Mitigating Effects of Relative Size and Systemic Im-
portance
There is no reason to consider that banks should react uniformly to the
introduction of a deposit insurance scheme. The responses of banks depends
entirely on the implicit subsidy they receive from deposit insurance adoption.
This implicit subsidy is largely determined by the intensity of the market
discipline existing before adoption: the stronger the market discipline ex ante,
the larger the subsidy ex post. For instance, a bank that would not be subject
to market discipline ex ante should not react at all to the deposit insurance
adoption. If we thus assume that banks that are systemically important
already beneﬁt from implicit state guarantees, we should observe a negative
relation between the responses of banks and their systemic importance. In
this paragraph, I present evidence supporting this hypothesis.
For this purpose, I use two indicators of systemic importance: the bank
market share in terms of deposits, i.e the domestic relative size, and the ratio
of bank assets to GDP. However, these indicators of systemic importance
are likely to be impacted by deposit insurance adoption. To address this
endogeneity issue (Roberts and Whited (2011)), I use the pre-treatment value
of these two measures. Say diﬀerently, I utilize indicators that are computed
over the period preceding adoption. Formally, I deﬁne the two indicators
of ex ante systemic importance as an average value over the period before
adoption (excluding the year of adoption)34:
MarketSharei, j =
∑
t<tˆj −1
MarketSharei, j, t
(tˆj − 1 − t0)
AssetOverGDPi, j =
∑
t<tˆj −1
AssetOverGDPi, j, t
(tˆj − 1 − t0)
Implementation of this methodology leads to the loss of a large number
of observations.35 I then extend the baseline speciﬁcation by including in-
34The results presented below are robust to alternative definitions of the ex ante indi-
cators used. In unreported regressions, I confirm the results using indicators of systemic
importance computed over the period that precedes adoption including the year of adop-
tion, or excluding the year of adoption and the year immediately before. I have also used
indicators computed as the last value one or two periods before adoption.
35This is so because all the countries having adopted a deposit insurance scheme before
the 90’s have no observations for these years. But most of these observations are not used
to identify the effect of deposit insurance adoption in the baseline specification
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teraction terms between these indicators and the deposit insurance adoption
dummy:
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t ·MarketSharei, j + µ ·MarketSharei, j (6.6)
θt ·MarketSharei, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t ·AssetOverGDPi, j + µ ·AssetOverGDPi, j(6.7)
θt ·AssetOverGDPi, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
where ui and θt are bank and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. The identiﬁcation of
ω relies of on the comparison within the same country of the response of
banks with diﬀerent systemic importance to deposit insurance adoption. We
expect to ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient for β and a positive coeﬃcient for ω: as
banks become more and more systemically important, the intensity of their
response should diminish.
The set of interaction terms between time ﬁxed-eﬀects and ex ante in-
dicators (θt ·MarketSharei, j and θt · AssetOverGDPi, j) aims to control for the
fact that banks with diﬀerent ex ante systemic importance may also have
diﬀerent evolutions of risk-taking over time within the same country (inde-
pendently of the deposit insurance adoption). I do not want to confound the
heterogeneity in the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance depending on the
ex ante systemic importance with “natural” diﬀerences in the evolution of
risk-taking over time for banks having diﬀerent ex ante systemic importance.
The results are presented in tables 10 and 11. In the ﬁrst two columns, I repli-
cate the baseline speciﬁcation to conﬁrm that the previous ﬁndings remain
valid after the loss of observations caused by the construction of systemic
indicators. The next two columns present the results of speciﬁcation (6.4)
and (6.7) without any covariates while the last two columns include these
latter.
The ﬁrst two columns corroborate that introducing a deposit insurance
scheme increases the leverage ratio of banks and then translates into higher
risk of insolvency. Note that the loss of observations discussed just above
induces only a very small change in the magnitude of βˆ in both regressions
: it conﬁrms that most of these lost observations are without any eﬀects
on the estimation of βˆ. When considering the results of speciﬁcation (6.4)
and (6.7), it appears that deposit insurance adoption continues to have a
negative and signiﬁcant on the banks’ capital buﬀer, i.e βˆ < 0 . However,
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the coeﬃcient associated with the interaction terms DIj,t · MarketSharei, j and
DIj,t ·AssetOverGDPi, j is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero indicating
that the response of banks to the implementation of deposit insurance is
strongly mitigated by systemic importance of the banks.
For instance, in the case of the Capital-to-Assets ratio, the eﬀect of de-
posit insurance diminishes with systemic importance and becomes indistin-
guishable from zero for banks having an ex ante domestic market share larger
than 23%, which corresponds to banks in the last decile of the distribution.
Similarly, the eﬀect of deposit insurance becomes insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero when banks have an ex ante ratio of assets over GDP larger than
24% : those banks belong to the top 5% of the distribution. All these results
remain valid if I use alternative indicators like the market share in terms of
assets or liabilities and the ratio of liabilities over GDP.
There is an important conclusion that can be drawn from these ﬁndings.
First, the restricted set of banks that can be considered as systemically im-
portant, those who are commonly referred to as too big to fail, seems to be
insensitive to adoption of deposit insurance. One plausible explanation is
that these very large banks were perceived by depositors as beneﬁting from
implicit state guarantees before deposit insurance adoption. Alternatively,
we could think about systemic importance as a source of market power that
makes the banks less sensitive to market discipline by depositors. In both
cases, it strongly reduces the implicit subsidy they get from deposit insur-
ance. Conversely, small banks are intensively monitored by depositors in
absence of safety net : they are immediately punished for any diminution of
their capital buﬀer. As a result, they take the greatest advantage from the
relaxation of market discipline induced by deposit insurance adoption.
These results are consistent with previous ﬁndings of Ioannidou and Pe-
nas (2010) showing that diﬀerences between large and small banks in term of
risky loans origination are reduced by deposit insurance. They are also in line
with the paper of Gropp and Vesala (2004), but the strategy implemented
in this paper has two advantages compared with their study. First, it con-
trols for the possible endogenous reaction of systemic indicators to deposit
insurance adoption as well as for the bias introduced by changes in coverage
of BankScope. Second it does not use ad hoc threshold to deﬁne systemic
banks. However, the present results could be perceived as inconsistent with
those of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) who establish that systemically
large banks are subject to greater market discipline because they appear to
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be too big to save.36 But, both ﬁndings can be reconciled if we consider that
deposit insurance is not a credible protection for those banks that are too big
to save: they are thus not impacted by deposit insurance adoption as shown
in this paper.
Finally, the ﬁndings presented in this section suggest that, by allowing
small and non systemic banks to reduce their capital buﬀer, deposit insurance
adoption is likely to promote competition on the banking market by reduc-
ing the comparative advantage of large and systemic ﬁnancial institutions.37
Interestingly, this eﬀect has often been stated as an important motivation for
adopting a system of deposit insurance (Garcia (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt
et al. (2008)).
6.3.2 Deposit Insurance Adoption and Leverage: a Convergence
Process Across Banks
It is equally important to examine how the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit in-
surance is distributed across banks with heterogeneous initial capital buﬀer.
From an aggregate perspective, understanding which banks react the most to
deposit insurance adoption according to their initial leverage is essential. In-
deed, ﬁnancial stability is impacted diﬀerently depending on whether a small
group of highly leveraged banks tends to become even more under-capitalized
or whether safer banks start to catch up more risky ones. In the ﬁrst case, we
face a build-up of fragility in a small segment of the banking market. In the
second case, the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption is spread
across the entire banking system.
To investigate this question, I use the same methodology as before. I
start by computing indicators of ex ante leverage by taking the average value
before adoption of two proxies for leverage: the Capital-to-Assets ratio and
the Liabilities-to-Equity ratio. Then, I interact these indicators with the
deposit insurance dummy. Formally, I run the following regressions:
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t · CARi, j + µ · CARi, j (6.8)
θt · CARi, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
36Note that the authors document the opposite pattern when using the market share
which is now consistent with the results established in this paper.
37Cordella and Yeyati (2002) or Matutes and Vives (1996) examine theoretically the
relationships between deposit insurance and competition
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Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t · LiabToEquityi, j + µ · LiabToEquityi, j (6.9)
θt · LiabToEquityi, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
The results can be found in the table 12 and 13 and they are unambiguous.
We observe a negative impact of ex ante leverage ratio on the banks’ response
to deposit insurance adoption: the least leveraged banks before the reform
are those reacting the most intensively to deposit insurance adoption. For
instance, the coeﬃcients in the third column of table 13 indicate that there
is no eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption on the Capital-to-Assets ratio for
banks having an initial Liabilities-to-Equity ratio above 16: the 10% most
leveraged banks are thus insensitive to introduction of deposit guarantees.
Similarly, only banks having an initial Capital-to-Assets ratio above 12%
reduce their capital buﬀer after deposit insurance adoption.
Following the implementation of deposit insurance, deposits ﬁnancing
becomes relatively cheaper compare to capital. Indeed, deposit insurance
schemes induce important deviations from the Modigliani-Miller world (Ad-
mati et al. (2011)). Hence, in absence of actuarially fair premia (in particular
risk-based premia), highly capitalized banks should substitute deposits to
equity. Otherwise, they would implicitly subsidize most leveraged banks, be-
cause they would pay the same premium without taking full advantage from
the cheaper source of funding provided by insured deposits. This explains
why we observe an important response from the most capitalized banks. In
contrast, the absence of reaction from least capitalized banks could also be
explained by regulatory capital constraints : they have less room to reduce
their Capital-to-Assets ratio by substituting deposits to equity ﬁnancing. 38
Accordingly, deposit insurance adoption tends to make the distribution of
leverage ratios across banks much more concentrated around its mean. The
between standard deviation of the Capital-to-Assets ratio decreases from 0.13
before adoption to 0.10 after adoption. This pattern can also be observed by
looking at ﬁgure 3.
All these ﬁndings established in this section are robust to the inclusion of
country-speciﬁc trends, both linear and quadratic. More importantly, they
are robust to the inclusion of banking crisis index and banking supervision
38However regulatory constraints cannot fully explain the relation exhibited because
even in restricting the sample to banks having an initial Capital-to-Assets ratio higher
than 15% or 20%, we continue to capture a negative relation between initial leverage and
banks’ reaction. Results available upon request.
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index as well as interaction terms of these two indicators with the various
measures used : market share, assets over GDP and initial leverage. In
other words, I continue to capture the heterogeneous responses of banks
to deposit insurance adoption even after controlling for the heterogeneous
eﬀects of banking crisis and banking supervision on banks according to their
size, systemic importance and initial market share. In other words, this
heterogeneity with respect to deposit insurance adoption cannot be confused
with heterogeneity with respect to banking crisis or other changes in banking
regulation. All these robustness checks are presented in tables 17, 18, 19 and
20.
Overall, we bring evidence that small, non systemic and well-capitalized
banks react the most to deposit insurance adoption. There are two impor-
tant lessons from this analysis. First, we observe a convergence across banks
in terms of leverage ratio after the implementation of deposit insurance: ini-
tially well-capitalized banks increase much more their leverage after deposit
insurance adoption than initially highly leveraged banks. Second, deposit
insurance adoption has some important competitive effects by removing the
comparative advantage of large and systemic banks and by improving com-
petition on the banking market. But, if not supplemented with additional
regulatory constraints, adopting a deposit insurance also makes the whole
banking system less well-capitalized and thus less resilient to large shocks.
7 Robustness checks
In this section, I present additional robustness checks. I start by replicating
the results using a sample restricted to countries adopting a deposit insurance
scheme during the period under study. Second, I use the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
estimators to conﬁrm the validity of the results under weaker assumptions.
Third, I deal with a crucial issue in a quasi diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework:
the so-called serial correlation issue. For the sake of brevity, I present the
other robustness checks in the appendix B.
Treated sample As explain in the section concerning the data, I choose to
perform the estimations on the largest sample, mainly to have a stable control
group over time. This sample includes countries for which we do not observe
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implementation of deposit insurance scheme during the period covered.39 It
can be countries that adopted a deposit insurance scheme before the ﬁrst
year of the period studied (1986), or countries that do not have a deposit
insurance system yet. When using this extended sample, the control group on
which the identiﬁcation relies includes these countries. A classical robustness
check consists in replicating the regressions using a diﬀerent control group
(Roberts and Whited (2011)). In particular, ﬁnding diﬀerent results would
cast doubt on the fundamental common trend assumption. I thereby restrict
the sample by excluding countries with no policy change. The results are
shown in table 14.
For both the leverage ratio and the distance-to-default, the coeﬃcient
associated with the deposit insurance adoption dummy remains highly sig-
niﬁcant. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients are only slightly lower than those
from the baseline regressions. Hence, the main result established previously
appears robust to the use of alternative control group.
First-Difference estimation The baseline speciﬁcation (5.1) estimates
the impact of deposit insurance adoption in a fixed-effects framework. How-
ever, the consistency of these estimates relies on strong assumptions. In
this paragraph, I present the results of regressions using the first-difference
estimators. Under the assumption of homoskedasticity and no serial corre-
lation in the error term, the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators is more eﬃcient than
the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimators. In contrast, consistency of the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
estimator is obtained under a weaker assumption: the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the
idiosyncratic error must be serially uncorrelated, i.e error terms must follow
a random walk (Wooldridge (2010)). In addition, this ﬁrst-diﬀerence estima-
tion helps to know whether the deposit insurance adoption has an immediate
impact on leverage. Precisely, I regress the following speciﬁcation:
∆Riski,j,t = β · ∆DIj,t + γ · ∆Xi,j,t +∆θt +∆ǫi,j,t
where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator. The results are presented in table 15.
Additionally, I also perform an estimation allowing for bank-speciﬁc trends.40
This model writes:
39See table 1
40These class of models are called correlated random trend models. See Wooldridge
(2010) p. 315 and also http://www.cemmap.ac.uk/resources/imbens_wooldridge/
slides_11.pdf
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Riski,j,t = α+ β · DIj,t + γ · Xi,j,t + θt + ui + φ · Trendt · ui + ǫi,j,t
If we ﬁrst-diﬀerence this model, we get:
∆Riski,j,t = β · ∆DIj,t + γ · ∆Xi,j,t +∆θt + ui +∆ǫi,j,t
Observe that we have now bank ﬁxed-eﬀects directly in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
equation. Hence, we can estimate this equation by using the ﬁxed-eﬀect es-
timator or by diﬀerencing again. The results being roughly the same I only
present those from the ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions. These results are also re-
ported in table 15.
The coeﬃcient in table 15 largely conﬁrms the previous results. First, the
two risk indicators give additional evidence that adoption of deposit insur-
ance favors high leverage ratios even under weaker statistical assumptions.
Second, while the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator assesses the long term eﬀect of de-
posit insurance, the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator captures the immediate jump
in risk-taking. Here, we see that providing guarantees on deposits has an
immediate eﬀect on the bank capital buﬀer. This short term reaction of
banks to deposit insurance adoption is somewhat lower in magnitude than
their long term response. Third, allowing for bank-speciﬁc trends in leverage
and risk of insolvency gives almost the same results as before. We continue
to observe an eﬀect that is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Overall
these ﬁndings do not alter the main message of the paper.
Serial correlation In their inﬂuential paper, Bertrand et al. (2004) argue
that estimations based on the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method are subject to
a possibly severe serial correlation problems. To overcome this issue, they
propose a range of solutions. The present paper implements the solution that
proposes to ignore time-series information when computing standard errors.
First, the risk-taking measurements are regressed on bank and year ﬁxed-
eﬀects and possibly, on all the covariates previously used except the deposit
insurance adoption dummy. The residuals of the treated countries only41
are then divided into two groups: residuals from years before adoption, and
those from years after adoption. Finally, the eﬀect of adoption is estimated
by OLS: the residuals are regressed on the deposit insurance dummy in a two
periods model. The results are shown in table 16.
41i.e. those for which we observe an adoption during the period covered.
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For each dependent variable, the ﬁrst column uses the combined residual
(ǫi,j,t + ui) and the second column uses the overall error component alone
(ǫi,j,t). We are mainly interested by the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃ-
cients. Most the coeﬃcient presented in this table are highly signiﬁcant : only
the coeﬃcient in column 3 is not signiﬁcant at all while the coeﬃcient in the
ﬁrst column is signiﬁcantly distinct from zero at the 10% level. In conclusion,
the potential serial correlation issue threatening the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimates of policy change does not appear to be a crucial problem in the
present paper.
Further robustness checks In the appendix B, I run several additional
robustness checks: I consider the potential problem posed by Mergers and
Acquisitions, I replicates the baseline regression on various sub-samples, and
I add bank-level control variables. Moreover, replications of the baseline
speciﬁcation using the z-score in level and various versions of the log of z-
score can also be found in this appendix B. The main ﬁnding of this paper
is always conﬁrmed: banks tend to adopt more risky behavior after deposit
insurance adoption, especially by reducing their capital buﬀer.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the causal relation existing between adoption
of deposit insurance and bank risk-taking by underlying the prominent role
of changes in leverage. This is clearly a topical issue as the recent events
in Cyprus has shown. The moral hazard related to guarantees oﬀered to
banks has been largely discussed when states and central banks have provided
bailouts to the banking industry in the midst of the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Focusing on the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption on bank capital buﬀer,
this paper aims to provide a contribution to this very challenging issue.
This study shows that we observe a signiﬁcant increase in bank risk of
insolvency after introduction of deposit insurance. The magnitude of this
eﬀect is roughly 30% to 45% of one sample standard deviation of the various
risk indicators used. Above all, this paper argues that the downward shift
in bank distance-to-default is mainly caused by an increase in bank leverage:
banks tend to reduce their capital buﬀer by almost 15% after implementation
of deposit insurance. These results are consistent with both the theoretical
and the empirical literature.
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In order to rule out the possibility of spurious correlations due to reverse
causation or simultaneity, I run various sensitivity checks. In particular, I
run a falsiﬁcation test showing that bank capital buﬀer starts to decrease sig-
niﬁcantly only after deposit insurance adoption and not before. Additionally,
I perform a placebo analysis in simulating false deposit insurance adoption.
I conclude that the observed eﬀect cannot be explained by pre-existing up-
ward shifts in bank risk-taking. Second, I also discuss the possibility that
the adverse eﬀect captured in this paper could be related to simultaneous
changes in banking regulation or by contemporaneous banking crises. Tests
provided in this paper show that it is quite unlikely.
Most importantly, I ﬁnd that relatively large and systemic banks as well
as most highly leveraged banks tend to be unresponsive to the deposit in-
surance adoption. I cannot capture any signiﬁcant change in the leverage
ratio for the top 10% most systemic banks or for the top 20% most lever-
aged banks. The ﬁrst result is consistent with the view that systemic banks
are not subject to market discipline because they beneﬁt from implicit state
guarantees. Hence, they do not react to the introduction of explicit deposit
insurance. As such, deposit insurance could have important competitive ef-
fects by removing the comparative advantage of large and systemic banks.
The second result is interesting because it sheds light on the convergence
process induced by deposit insurance adoption. To avoid to subsidize highly
leveraged banks, well-capitalized banks reduce signiﬁcantly more their capi-
tal buﬀer. Overall, these results oﬀer contrasting views on deposit insurance:
only the less fragile banks seem to increase their leverage after deposit in-
surance adoption but the whole domestic banking industry is less adequately
capitalized after implementation of deposit guarantees.
All the results presented in this paper tend to conﬁrm that deposit in-
surance adoption induces an excessive risk-taking by banks, especially with
regard to bank leverage. These ﬁndings are in line with the previous research
concerning the relaxation of market discipline caused by deposit insurance
adoption. Recently, in reaction to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 many countries
have decided to increase the amount of deposits covered by guarantee funds
(USA and EU for instance). Other countries (Australia, New Zealand) have
adopted an explicit deposit insurance scheme for the ﬁrst time in their his-
tory. The European Union want to design a uniﬁed deposit insurance system
in the very next years. The results established in this paper reaﬃrm the ne-
cessity to control adequately the perverse incentives that deposit insurance
provides to banks with a particular focus on the capital buﬀer of banks. The
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decision to include a raw leverage ratio in the Basel III regulatory standards
can be viewed as an important step in this direction. But results presented in
this paper suggest that introduction of risk-based premia, in particular pre-
mia based on the capital buﬀer of banks (as proposed by Bond and Crocker
(1993) and more recently by Acharya et al. (2010)) would help to mitigate
the perverse incentives provided by deposit insurance.
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Note: These figures show the evolutions of the average and the median Capital-to-
Assets ratio (top) and log of z-score (bottom) across time computed over the sample
of banks that face a deposit insurance adoption.
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Note: These figures show the distribution of the average Capital-to-Assets ratio (top)
and log of z-score (bottom) before (in blue) and after (in white) deposit insurance
adoption. The sample of banks is restricted to banks for which we have observations
before and after deposit insurance adoption. A lower value signals an increase in leverage
(top) or in the probability of default (bottom).
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Note: These figures show the distribution of the average Capital-to-Assets ratio (top)
and log of z-score (bottom) before (in blue) and after (in white) deposit insurance
adoption. The sample of banks is restricted to banks for which we have observations
before and after deposit insurance adoption. There is only one observation per banks and
per period (before/after). A lower value signals an increase in the leverage (top) or in the
probability of default (bottom).
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Note: These figures show the dynamics of the impact of deposit insurance adoption on
the Capital-to-Assets ratio (top) and the log of z-score (bottom).The solid blue line
represents the point estimate while the dashed red lines display 95% confidence intervals.
The underlying regression used a set of dummy variables for each year before and after
deposit insurance adoption. The two very last dummy variables take the value of 1 for all
the periods more than 6 years before adoption and for all the periods more than 7 year
after the adoption. The reference year is the year preceding adoption (year -1).
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Table 1: Deposit Insurance Scheme. Year of Adoption
Country Name Year of Adoption Nb of banks Country Name Year of Adoption Nb of banks
USA 1934 9935 LITHUANIA 1996 11
INDIA 1961 80 SUDAN 1996 17
NORWAY 1961 122 SWEDEN 1996 101
DOMINICAN REP. 1962 48 MACEDONIA 1997 14
PHILIPPINES 1963 36 SLOVAKIA 1997 18
GERMANY 1966 2215 THAILAND 1997 25
CANADA 1967 46 ALGERIA 1998 15
FINLAND 1969 11 CROATIA 1998 42
JAPAN 1971 681 ESTONIA 1998 6
BELGIUM 1975 78 INDONESIA 1998 99
NETHERLANDS 1979 43 LATVIA 1998 22
FRANCE 1980 399 BULGARIA 1999 23
SPAIN 1980 175 ECUADOR 1999 22
UNITED KINGDOM 1982 193 BAHAMAS 2000 21
TURKEY 1983 32 BELARUS 2000 11
BANGLADESH 1984 30 EL SALVADOR 2000 16
SWITZERLAND 1984 405 KAZAKHSTAN 2000 17
COLOMBIA 1985 34 VIETNAM 2000 29
KENYA 1986 37 CYPRUS 2001 17
TRINIDAD & TOB. 1986 10 HONDURAS 2001 22
DENMARK 1987 104 JORDAN 2001 12
ITALY 1987 692 NICARAGUA 2001 6
SRI LANKA 1987 11 SLOVENIA 2001 22
AUSTRIA 1988 270 ALBANIA 2002 9
NIGERIA 1988 37 BOLIVIA 2002 14
IRELAND 1989 27 BOSNIA-HERZ. 2002 16
LUXEMBOURG 1989 126 GUATEMALA 2002 36
SERBIA 1989 31 UKRAINE 2002 46
MEXICO 1990 43 MALTA 2003 7
PERU 1991 25 URUGUAY 2003 30
HUNGARY 1993 32 MOLDOVA REP. 2004 15
MOROCCO 1993 11 PARAGUAY 2004 22
BAHRAIN 1994 21 RUSSIAN FED. 2004 875
TANZANIA 1994 22 ARMENIA 2005 14
UGANDA 1994 11 MALAYSIA 2006 46
ARGENTINA 1995 71 SINGAPORE 2006 15
CZECH REP. 1995 26 AZERBAIJAN 2007 18
GREECE 1995 25 HONG KONG 2007 28
OMAN 1995 8 AUSTRALIA 2008 19
POLAND 1995 44 YEMEN 2008 11
PORTUGAL 1995 29 NEW ZEALAND 2009 13
BRAZIL 1996 150 CAMEROON 2011 7
KOREA REP. OF 1996 16 GABON 2011 4
The following countries don’t have explicit deposit insurance scheme: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, China People’s Rep., Costa Rica, Egypt, Georgia Rep. Of, Ghana, Iran, Israel,
Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Pakistan,
Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia and Zambia
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Main Sample
ln(z-score) 205583 3.12 1.03 2.48 3.23 3.84
z-score 206534 35.85 41.12 11.76 25.09 46.21
Capital-to-Assets ratio 207060 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.12
Return on Average Assets 206536 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01
Log of Total Assets 207060 6.29 2.66 4.52 5.61 7.28
Net Interest Revenue / Avg Assets 205549 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Deposit Market Share 207060 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 207060 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.20
Cost-to-Income ratio 204539 0.71 0.39 0.58 0.67 0.77
HHI index on Deposits 2319 0.29 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.35
GDP growth (annual %) 2319 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Inflation (annual %) 2319 19.63 154.11 2.23 4.58 9.38
Log of GDP per capita 2319 10.62 2.13 9.40 10.35 11.91
Sample Limited to Banks Facing Deposit Insurance Adoption
ln(z-score) 24963 2.55 1.05 1.94 2.65 3.27
z-score 25191 20.36 23.44 6.77 14.04 26.17
Capital-to-Assets ratio 25329 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.18
Return on Average Assets 25192 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02
Log of Total Assets 25329 8.01 2.85 6.11 7.50 9.25
Net Interest Revenue / Avg Assets 24932 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06
Deposit Market Share 25329 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 25329 0.31 0.21 0.15 0.26 0.42
Cost-to-Income ratio 24648 0.70 0.39 0.52 0.67 0.84
HHI index on Deposits 1072 0.29 0.23 0.13 0.22 0.35
GDP growth (annual %) 1072 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06
Inflation (annual %) 1072 28.32 186.84 2.39 4.66 9.58
Log of GDP per capita 1072 10.40 2.31 8.97 9.96 11.45
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Before and After Adoption
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Before Deposit Insurance Adoption
log of z-score 2625 2.29 1.02 1.73 2.38 2.93
Capital-to-Assets ratio 2699 0.1493 0.1193 0.0747 0.1113 0.1849
Liabilities-to-Equity ratio 2697 10.24 13.96 4.41 7.97 12.37
After Deposit Insurance Adoption
log of z-score 5836 2.16 1.05 1.52 2.24 2.90
Capital-to-Assets ratio 5956 0.1352 0.1098 0.0734 0.1049 0.1567
Liabilities-to-Equity ratio 5952 10.93 16.24 5.37 8.53 12.62
This table provides descriptive statistics before and after deposit insurance adoption for banks facing an
adoption. N is the number of observation. Mean is the mean value. SD is the standard deviation of
banks. p25, Median and p75 are the 25th, the 50th and the 75th percentile threshold.
Table 4: Baseline speciﬁcation
Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score) Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0230** -0.1797** -0.0189** -0.1924**
(0.0030) (0.0001) (0.0071) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0047 -0.0889
(0.7059) (0.3782)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0150 0.4881
(0.8086) (0.3042)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.9085) (0.3455)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0333* 0.1110
(0.0354) (0.3558)
Observations 207,060 205,583 207,060 205,583
Number of id 18,825 18,814 18,825 18,814
Adjusted R-squared 0.0056 0.0183 0.0067 0.0195
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way
Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not include
the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 5: Sample Standard Deviation of Risk-Taking
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Capital-to-Assets ratio overall .1504638 .1342641 N = 25329
between .1214999 n = 2686
within .0723533 T-bar = 9.43001
log of z-score overall 2.551565 1.045221 N = 24963
between .9901594 n = 2682
within .4017789 T-bar = 9.30761
This table provides additional descriptive statistics for banks facing an adoption. N is the number of
observation. Mean is the mean value. Within Std. Dev. is the standard deviation of within banks, i.e.
the deviation from each individual’s average. Between Std. Dev. is the standard deviation across banks,
i.e the standard deviation of individual’s average. p25, Median and p75 are the 25th, the 50th and the
75th percentile threshold.
Table 6: Speciﬁcation with linear country-speciﬁc trends
Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score) Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0204** -0.1541** -0.0204** -0.1465**
(0.0087) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0108 0.0453
(0.3590) (0.5645)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0733 -0.3077
(0.1357) (0.3078)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0000
(0.7891) (0.6070)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0365 0.3453
(0.2444) (0.0580)
Observations 207,060 205,583 207,060 205,583
Number of id 18,825 18,814 18,825 18,814
Adjusted R-squared 0.0213 0.0528 0.0223 0.0534
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trend Linear Linear Linear Linear
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way
Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into
account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 7: Speciﬁcation with linear and quadratic country-speciﬁc trends
Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score) Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0179* -0.1330** -0.0176** -0.1295**
(0.0128) (0.0000) (0.0085) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0077 0.0334
(0.5123) (0.6466)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0466 -0.2418
(0.3579) (0.4136)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001**
(0.1369) (0.0021)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0767* 0.0773
(0.0394) (0.6660)
Observations 207,060 205,583 207,060 205,583
Number of id 18,825 18,814 18,825 18,814
Adjusted R-squared 0.0261 0.0620 0.0273 0.0623
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trend Lin.& Quad. Lin.& Quad. Lin.& Quad. Lin.& Quad.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way
Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into
account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 8: Falsiﬁcation test
Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score) Capital-to-Assets Ratio ln(z-score)
Years ≤ -6 0.0099 0.1062
(0.3197) (0.1164)
Year -6 0.0014 -0.0140
(0.8369) (0.7468)
Years -5 0.0058 0.0717 -0.0036 -0.0396
(0.5263) (0.1836) (0.5802) (0.4823)
Year -4 0.0054 0.0858 -0.0040 -0.0256
(0.4827) (0.0710) (0.6567) (0.6622)
Year -3 0.0058 0.0602 -0.0036 -0.0512
(0.4784) (0.1447) (0.7331) (0.3641)
Year -2 0.0006 0.0250 -0.0087 -0.0865
(0.9090) (0.3906) (0.3624) (0.2035)
Year -1 -0.0094 -0.1115
(0.3829) (0.1432)
Year of adoption -0.0035 -0.0642 -0.0319* -0.2780*
(0.4430) (0.0573) (0.0222) (0.0119)
Year 1 -0.0199** -0.1457** -0.0129 -0.1757*
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.2522) (0.0140)
Year 2 -0.0290** -0.1830** -0.0293* -0.2572**
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0199) (0.0022)
Year 3 -0.0322** -0.1786** -0.0384** -0.2945**
(0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0083) (0.0038)
Year 4 -0.0242** -0.1352** -0.0416* -0.2901**
(0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0109) (0.0066)
Year 5 -0.0110 -0.1010 -0.0336* -0.2468**
(0.2245) (0.0697) (0.0118) (0.0054)
Year 6 -0.0191* -0.1457** -0.0204 -0.2126*
(0.0116) (0.0049) (0.1152) (0.0169)
Years ≥ 7 -0.0225** -0.1665* -0.0285* -0.2572**
(0.0093) (0.0112) (0.0291) (0.0079)
Observations 207,060 205,583 207,060 205,583
Number of id 18,825 18,814 18,825 18,814
Adjusted R-squared 0.0076 0.0194 0.0076 0.0194
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variables Year "i" or Year "-i" are dummy variables taking the
value of one exactly "i" years before or after deposit insurance adoption. The variables Years ≥ "i" or
Years ≤ "-i" are dummy variable taking the value of one "i" years, "i+1" years, "i+2" years... after deposit
insurance adoption or "-i" years, "-i-1" years, "-i-2" years... before deposit insurance adoption. Standard
errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions
includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank
fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 9: Controlling for Banking Crises and Simultaneous Changes in Banking Regulation
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0189** -0.1924** -0.0187** -0.1912** -0.0192* -0.1939** - 0.0183* -0.1891** -0.0190* -0.1929**
(0.0071) (0.0000) (0.0080) (0.0000) (0.0195) (0.0002) (0.0251) (0.0002) (0.0209) (0.0002)
HHI index on deposit 0.0047 -0.0889 0.0043 -0.0908 -0.0011 -0.1002 -0.0019 -0.1067 -0.0012 -0.1010
(0.7059) (0.3782) (0.7286) (0.3636) (0.9426) (0.3872) (0.8985) (0.3497) (0.9352) (0.3823)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0150 0.4881 -0.0054 0.5330 -0.0241 0.6068 -0.0232 0.6062 -0.0164 0.6547
(0.8086) (0.3042) (0.9328) (0.3174) (0.7415) (0.2970) (0.7459) (0.2830) (0.8301) (0.3125)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.9085) (0.3455) (0.8699) (0.3645) (0.9536) (0.3564) (0.7307) (0.4659) (0.9301) (0.3713)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0333* 0.1110 -0.0312* 0.1208 -0.0334 0.1010 -0.0281 0.1481 -0.0320 0.1092
(0.0354) (0.3558) (0.0481) (0.3028) (0.0566) (0.4301) (0.1155) (0.2885) (0.0677) (0.3921)
Banking Crisis 0.0023 0.0109 0.0016 0.0101
(0.2615) (0.6811) (0.4579) (0.7171)
Banking Supervision -0.0026 -0.0331 -0.0025 -0.0326
(0.4258) (0.2233) (0.4347) (0.2181)
Financial Reform Index -0.0024* -0.0227*
(0.0316) (0.0165)
Observations 207,060 205,583 207,060 205,583 200,354 199,075 200,354 199,075 200,354 199,075
Number of id 18,825 18,814 18,825 18,814 18,184 18,174 18,184 18,174 18,184 18,174
Adjusted R-squared 0.0067 0.0195 0.0068 0.0196 0.0071 0.0213 0.0074 0.0218 0.0071 0.0214
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable Banking Crisis is a country-year-specific dummy taking the value of one during the years a given
country experiences a banking crisis. The variable Banking Supervision is a country-year-specific index taking values between 0 and 3 in which
higher values indicate more banking regulation. The variable Financial Reform Index is a country-year-specific index taking values between 0 and
21 in which higher values indicate higher financial liberalization. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way
Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed
effects to the explained variance.
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Table 10: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Market Share in terms
of Deposits
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0226** -0.1725** -0.0276** -0.1975** -0.0234** -0.1744**
(0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001)
DI* ex ante Market Share 0.0708** 0.4127* 0.0758** 0.4230*
(0.0089) (0.0440) (0.0092) (0.0453)
HHI index on deposit 0.0334* 0.1783
(0.0329) (0.1390)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0751* 0.6731**
(0.0397) (0.0044)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0000
(0.7681) (0.5674)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1239** -0.4932**
(0.0000) (0.0077)
Observations 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394
Number of id 891 889 891 889 891 889
Adjusted R-squared 0.0167 0.0166 0.0212 0.0272 0.0494 0.0397
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Market Share NO NO YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Market Share is an interaction term between
the deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank
before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the market share on deposits over the periods
preceding adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way
Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into
account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 11: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Total Assets over GDP
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0226** -0.1725** -0.0251** -0.1894** -0.0202** -0.1638**
(0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0584** 0.3355** 0.0491** 0.2914**
(0.0010) (0.0053) (0.0010) (0.0090)
HHI index on deposit 0.0241 0.0899
(0.1578) (0.4984)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0831* 0.7133**
(0.0239) (0.0024)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.9604) (0.3827)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1228** -0.4762**
(0.0000) (0.0087)
Observations 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394
Number of id 891 889 891 889 891 889
Adjusted R-squared 0.0167 0.0166 0.0193 0.0267 0.0453 0.0374
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Assets/GDP NO NO YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Assets over GDP is an interaction term
between the deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the systemic importance of
each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the ratio of Assets to GDP over the
periods preceding adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-
way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take
into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
9 TABLES AND FIGURES 56
Table 12: The Eﬀect of the Initial Capital-to-Assets Ratio
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0226** -0.1725** 0.0210** -0.0657 0.0188* -0.0680
(0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0050) (0.1943) (0.0196) (0.1812)
DI*ex ante CAR -0.2570** -0.5907* -0.2270** -0.4829
(0.0001) (0.0150) (0.0005) (0.0522)
HHI index on deposit 0.0141 0.0472
(0.2851) (0.6517)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0662* 0.6618**
(0.0458) (0.0046)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000* 0.0000
(0.0459) (0.8278)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0751** -0.2538
(0.0050) (0.1315)
Observations 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394
Number of id 891 889 891 889 891 889
Adjusted R-squared 0.0167 0.0166 0.1811 0.1080 0.1914 0.1119
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante CAR NO NO YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante CAR is an interaction term between the
deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption.
It is computed as the average value of the Capital-to-Assets ratio over the periods preceding adoption.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All
regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution
of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 13: The Eﬀect of the Initial Liabilities-to-Equity ratio
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0204** -0.1410** -0.0363** -0.2630** -0.0313** -0.2403**
(0.0030) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity 0.0018** 0.0139** 0.0016** 0.0132**
(0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0333* 0.1135
(0.0277) (0.2444)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0676 0.5711**
(0.0720) (0.0046)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0000
(0.5287) (0.7548)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1010** -0.3627*
(0.0002) (0.0262)
Observations 8,116 7,940 8,116 7,940 8,116 7,940
Number of id 755 753 755 753 755 753
Adjusted R-squared 0.0166 0.0195 0.0465 0.0868 0.0703 0.0947
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity NO NO YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between
the deposit insurance adoption dummy and indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption.
It is computed as the average value of the the Liabilities-to-Equity ratio over the periods preceding
adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects
model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the
contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 14: Sample of Treated Countries
Capital-to-Assets ratio ln(z-score) Capital-to-Assets ratio ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0204** -0.1506** -0.0135* -0.1204**
(0.0077) (0.0004) (0.0263) (0.0016)
HHI index on deposit 0.0160 0.0379
(0.3969) (0.7982)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0030 0.3732
(0.9353) (0.1685)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.9551) (0.2911)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1220** -0.4341**
(0.0000) (0.0013)
Observations 25,329 24,963 25,329 24,963
Adjusted R-squared 0.0099 0.0114 0.0235 0.0170
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
Number of id 2,686 2,682 2,686 2,682
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the sample excludes all countries with no change in the Deposit
Insurance dummy, i.e. those having already adopted a Deposit Insurance scheme before the first year
of the sample and those without Deposit Insurance Scheme at the end of the sample. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions
includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank
fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 15: First-Diﬀerence and Bank-speciﬁc Trends
First Difference Bank Specific Trend
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
∆Deposit Insurance -0.0103** -0.1052** -0.0111** -0.1130** -0.0088** - 0.0908** -0.0096** -0.0955**
(0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0088) (0.0065) (0.0033) (0.0026)
∆HHI index on deposit 0.0090 0.0134 0.0079 -0.0048
(0.2732) (0.7899) (0.2882) (0.9266)
∆GDP growth (annual %) -0.0601 -0.2662 -0.0626 -0.3871
(0.2622) (0.3226) (0.2649) (0.1746)
∆Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0576) (0.0480) (0.0794) (0.0914)
∆Log of GDP per capita -0.0135 0.3133** -0.0184 0.4508**
(0.5116) (0.0043) (0.5378) (0.0046)
Observations 186,899 185,042 186,899 185,042 186,899 185,042 186,899 185,042
Number of id 18,825 18,812 18,825 18,812
Adjusted R-squared 0.0025 0.0090 0.0032 0.0093 0.0046 0.0082 0.0056 0.0086
Regression Type Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD
FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The first four columns presents the First-Difference estimator while the next four columns present the random correlated trend
model allowing for unit-specific (here bank) trends. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects
model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the
explained variance.
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Table 16: Aggregating across Country and Ignoring Time Series Information
Residuals Including Bank Fixed-effect Residuals Excluding Bank Fixed-effect
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0158 -0.1745** -0.0137 -0.1675** -0.0177** -0.1373** -0.0133* -0.1344**
(0.0643) (0.0078) (0.1885) (0.0071) (0.0059) (0.0000) (0.0165) (0.0002)
Observations 8,674 8,480 8,674 8,480 8,674 8,480 8,674 8,480
Adjusted R-squared 0.0041 0.0059 0.0018 0.0055 0.0130 0.0190 0.0074 0.0182
Regression Type OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Treated Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
First-Stage Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
First-Stage Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Here I implement the method suggested by Bertrand and Duflo (2004) to deal with serial correlation. First, I regress the
various risk proxies on banks FE, year FE and possibly covariates, excluding the deposit insurance dummy . Then I divide the residuals of banks
treated, i.e. those occuring an adoption of deposit insurance in the period covered, into to groups: residuals from years before the adoptions and
residuals from years after the adoptions. Finally, I regress these residuals on the deposit insurance dummy in a two-peridos panel frameworks. The
first four columns present regression from the the combined residual (including the banks FE) while the last four columns present regressions from
the the overall error component alone. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All
regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained
variance.
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Table 17: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Market Share in terms of Deposits. Robustness
Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0235** -0.1626** -0.0210** -0.1527** -0.0210** -0.1486** - 0.0224** -0.1671**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
DI*ex ante Market Share 0.0548** 0.3597** 0.0545* 0.2682 0.0543* 0.2663 0.0672* 0.2540
(0.0039) (0.0063) (0.0428) (0.1684) (0.0406) (0.1770) (0.0230) (0.2731)
HHI index on deposit 0.0159 0.1516 0.0155 0.1676 0.0195 0.1584
(0.3756) (0.0920) (0.3949) (0.0681) (0.3550) (0.1445)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0749** 0.4454** 0.0781** 0.3728* 0.0785** 0.4153**
(0.0060) (0.0044) (0.0083) (0.0339) (0.0037) (0.0071)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001*
(0.2036) (0.0757) (0.2300) (0.0859) (0.1241) (0.0489)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1053** -0.0288 -0.1028** -0.0825 -0.1284** -0.1191
(0.0018) (0.9153) (0.0011) (0.7467) (0.0003) (0.6867)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0004 -0.0402
(0.9468) (0.3803)
BC*ex ante Market Share 0.0214 -0.0514
(0.4387) (0.8818)
Banking Supervision (BS) -0.0107 -0.0633
(0.0510) (0.0884)
BS*ex ante Market Share 0.0330 0.3159*
(0.1760) (0.0407)
Observations 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 7,808 7,632
R-squared 0.1399 0.1401 0.1400 0.1405 0.1227 0.1308
Number of id 891 889 891 889 891 889 739 737
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year* ex ante Market Share YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Market Share is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy and
an indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the market share on deposits
over the periods preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex ante Market Share is an interaction term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the
indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex ante Market Share is an interaction term between
the Banking Supervision index and the indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. Standard errors clustered at the
country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not
take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 18: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Assets over GDP. Robustness Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0216** -0.1549** -0.0188** -0.1497** -0.0189** -0.1446** - 0.0198** -0.1652**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0383* 0.3072** 0.0307** 0.2982* 0.0295** 0.2950* 0.0312* 0.2746
(0.0137) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0195) (0.0066) (0.0189) (0.0393) (0.0764)
HHI index on deposit 0.0115 0.1055 0.0105 0.1249 0.0138 0.0939
(0.5462) (0.2703) (0.5962) (0.2054) (0.5439) (0.4169)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0832** 0.4915** 0.0856** 0.4088* 0.0893** 0.4523**
(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0126) (0.0005) (0.0023)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001
(0.1027) (0.0244) (0.1416) (0.0379) (0.1742) (0.0545)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1088** -0.0447 -0.1077** -0.1071 -0.1317** -0.1216
(0.0011) (0.8643) (0.0006) (0.6675) (0.0002) (0.6655)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0003 -0.0500
(0.9558) (0.2597)
BC*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0303 0.0249
(0.3172) (0.9630)
Banking Supervision (BS) -0.0098* -0.0538
(0.0398) (0.1010)
BS*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0623* 0.5257*
(0.0362) (0.0255)
Observations 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 7,808 7,632
R-squared 0.1348 0.1343 0.1349 0.1349 0.1193 0.1288
Number of id 891 889 891 889 891 889 739 737
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Assets/GDP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Assets over GDP is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy
and an indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the ratio of Assets to GDP
over the periods preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex ante Assets over GDP is an interaction term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the
indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex ante Assets over GDP is an interaction term between
the Banking Supervision index and the indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. Standard errors clustered at the
country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not
take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 19: The Eﬀect of the Initial Capital-to-Assets Ratio. Robustness Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance 0.0357** -0.0130 0.0216* -0.0333 0.0206* -0.0220 0.0295** -0.0256
(0.0000) (0.6604) (0.0140) (0.5092) (0.0163) (0.6664) (0.0038) (0.6563)
DI*ex ante CAR -0.3362** -0.7936** -0.2382** -0.6470** -0.2316** -0.6828** - 0.3070** -0.8497**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0059) (0.0002) (0.0057) (0.0001) (0.0008)
HHI index on deposit 0.0144 0.1082 0.0148 0.1291 0.0220 0.1238
(0.3715) (0.2292) (0.3681) (0.1567) (0.2186) (0.2186)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0706* 0.4630** 0.0715* 0.3691* 0.0699* 0.4071**
(0.0166) (0.0022) (0.0260) (0.0329) (0.0292) (0.0083)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001*
(0.1457) (0.0137) (0.1334) (0.0136) (0.1698) (0.0209)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0727* 0.0924 -0.0745* 0.0330 -0.0810* 0.0415
(0.0228) (0.7162) (0.0103) (0.8936) (0.0182) (0.8822)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0045 -0.0774
(0.4676) (0.2138)
BC*ex ante CAR -0.0308 0.1511
(0.5468) (0.5181)
Banking Supervision (BS) -0.0012 0.0021
(0.8860) (0.9721)
BS*ex ante CAR -0.0439 -0.2555
(0.4488) (0.3416)
Observations 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 9,610 9,394 7,808 7,632
R-squared 0.2575 0.1837 0.2578 0.1844 0.2492 0.1743
Number of id 891 889 891 889 891 889 739 737
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante CAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante CAR is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy and an
indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the Capital-to-Assets ratio over the periods
preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex ante CAR is an interaction term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the indicator reflecting the
leverage of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex ante CAR is an interaction term between the Banking Supervision index and the
indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way
Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed
effects to the explained variance.
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Table 20: The Eﬀect of the Initial Liabilities-to-Equity ratio. Robustness Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0319** -0.2808** -0.0333** -0.2777** -0.0337** -0.2767** -0.0380** -0.3169**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity 0.0013** 0.0157** 0.0016** 0.0156** 0.0016** 0.0155** 0.0019** 0.0164**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0106 0.0782 0.0093 0.0830 0.0205 0.1239
(0.6221) (0.4200) (0.6547) (0.3863) (0.3744) (0.2455)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0832** 0.4763** 0.0914** 0.4631* 0.0855** 0.3668*
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0020) (0.0103) (0.0028) (0.0324)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000* 0.0001** 0.0000* 0.0001** 0.0000* 0.0001**
(0.0201) (0.0046) (0.0179) (0.0053) (0.0104) (0.0043)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0903** -0.0468 -0.0823** -0.0534 -0.1097** -0.1178
(0.0050) (0.8293) (0.0068) (0.8030) (0.0016) (0.6317)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0089 0.0022
(0.2228) (0.9602)
BC*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity -0.0004 -0.0011
(0.3830) (0.6502)
Banking Supervision (BS) -0.0065 -0.0374
(0.2611) (0.4021)
BS*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity -0.0000 0.0020
(0.9033) (0.4236)
Observations 8,116 7,940 8,116 7,940 8,116 7,940 6,678 6,538
R-squared 0.1712 0.1870 0.1719 0.1871 0.1522 0.1728
Number of id 755 753 755 753 755 753 633 631
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy
and an indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the the Liabilities-to-Equity ratio
over the periods preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the
indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between the Banking
Supervision index and the indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value
in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the
contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Appendix A
Deposit Insurance Scheme Database
There already exists two important databases about deposit insurance schemes.
The ﬁrst one is the “Deposit Insurance Around the World data set” con-
structed by Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali and Laeven in 2003 (Demirguc-
Kunt et al. (2005) and then Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008)). It lists numer-
ous characteristics about deposit insurance schemes implemented around the
world until 2003. It provides data like the year of introduction, the amount of
deposits covered, the existence of coinsurance and many other features. The
second one is the “Bank Regulation and Supervision Database” constructed
by Barth, Caprio and Levine in 2001 (Barth et al. (2001)) and updated in
2008 and 2012.42 It contains roughly the same kind of information than the
previous ones (excepting the year of adoption however).
Unfortunately these two databases do not contain any information about
recent, i.e. post-2003, deposit insurance adoptions. Above all, they some-
times provide diﬀerent and contradicting information. As a ﬁrst step, I com-
pare these two databases to the data provided by reports from both the
International Association of Deposit Insurers and the The European Forum
of Deposit Insurers to build a unique and homogeneous database about de-
posit insurance scheme around the world. Especially, I use the four wave
of the “International Deposit Insurance Survey Questionnaire” (2003, 2008,
2010 and 2011)43 and the “Deposit Guarantee Systems: EFDI’s First Report”
(2006).44 I also look at some reports of the Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram45 from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund: in many
cases, they provide information about the existence and the year of adop-
tion of deposit insurance scheme. For European countries, I also confront the
42However the part concerning deposit insurance scheme doesn’t seem to have been
updated.
43http://www.iadi.org/Research.aspx?id=58
44http://www.efdi.net/documents.asp?Id=5&Cat=Efdi%20Publications
45http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/FPS/fsapcountrydb.nsf/
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sources with a report from the European Commission.46 Regarding countries
from the MENA region, I used a document summarizing the main informa-
tion about deposit insurance systems in this region.47 Finally, the consistency
of the year of adoption has also been inspected using the deposit insurance
websites.48
The main task consist in checking the exact year of introduction of deposit
insurance scheme. I also collect additional information about some deposit
insurance features like the existence of coinsurance mechanism (yes/no), the
nature of the premia collected (ﬂat or risk-based), or the timing of the funding
(ex ante, ex post, or both). However, there are important diﬃculties to get
consistent, reliable and time-varying information about these features. In
particular the various sources used do not indicate the year of implementation
of these features. For instance, imagine a country that adopted a deposit
insurance scheme in 1995. In the 2008 IADI survey, it is not possible to know
whether this country have coinsurance mechanism since 1995 or whether such
a feature have been implemented latter. Hence, these information can only
be exploited cross-sectionally. Using these information in a time-varying
framework would be at cost of strong assumptions.
In general, the previous sources provide a year of adoption corresponding
to the date at which the parliament votes the law establishing the deposit
insurance fund. It is very likely to observe some delay before the deposit
insurance scheme becomes eﬀective. When available, I take advantage from
the month of adoption: when the date provides a month after July, I change
the year of adoption by the year immediately following. At the end, I obtain
a database describing the year of adoption and some features of deposit
insurance schemes in 197 countries as shown in table 3.
Compared to the database of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005), I collect the
year of adoption for 24 additional countries. For 34 countries, the date of
adoption diﬀers from the one of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005). For 19 of these
34 countries, the diﬀerence is related to the delay between enactment by
the parliament and eﬀective implementation as explained before. In these
cases, the date of implementation is just one year after the one previously
established. It remains 13 countries for which dates of adoption diﬀer by more
46http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm
47http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/Resources/
MENAFlagshipDeposits2_25_11.pdf
48http://www.cdic.ca/CDIC/Cooperation/IntlLinks/Pages/default.aspx or
http://www.iadi.org/aboutIADI.aspx?id=48
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than one year (Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia-herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Guatemala, Honduras, Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, Portugal, Spain, and
Ukraine). However, in most of the cases, these diﬀerences are related to
longer delay between enactment and implementation.
Treatment of date
Most of the ﬁnancial companies publish their account statements at the end
of the year, namely in December. Nonetheless, sometimes banks use non-
calendar ﬁscal years to report their balance sheet statement (in March for
several big Japanese banks, in October for several big Canadian banks...).
On the top of that, even though BankScope provides us only with annual
data, for a few hundred observations you have duplicated observations for
balance sheet statements that closed at several dates within a single year. So
one needs to handle both the allocation issue over year t or t − 1 as well as
the duplicated issue of yearly ﬁnancial statements published several times a
year.
These diﬀerences raise an important issue. It is likely that one prefer to
compare data of ﬁnancial statements reported in March of year t with data of
ﬁnancial statements reported in December of year t−1 rather than with data
of ﬁnancial statements reported in December of year t. The help ﬁle from
Duprey and Lé (2012) proposes a small program that handles the situation
in a compact way. Here I summarize their method.
• First, I drop mid-year ﬁnancial reports because it is uncertain to which
year t or t − 1 one should attribute the observation. Precisely, I drop
observations with a month comprised between April and September.
• Then, I identify banks which have "natural" duplicates, i.e. banks with
the same id having at least two observations within the same ﬁscal
year. Essentially I remove an observation of the 30th November 2012 if
I have an observation for the 31th December 2012. Precisely, I always
keep the observation with:
– the month closest to December and if necessary,
– the day closest to the last day of the month.
• Third, if I have banks which report their ﬁnancial account in March
2012, it makes more sense to consider it as end of 2011 data. So for
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each observations with a reporting month before April, I replace the
actual year, saying t, by the previous year, saying t− 1.
• Last, note that the previous step is likely to create new duplicates.
So once again, the best strategy would be to keep the observation that
have the least forward looking information. Consequently, between two
observations reporting the same year after the previous change, I keep
the one with the variable year unchanged. For instance assume that I
have two observations reported in 2011 after the previous step. Then
I drop the observation reporting 2011 as year, with March as month
(and so 2012 as “true” year), provided I have already an observation
reporting 2011 as year, with September as month (and so 2011 as “true”
year).
For more details, see Duprey and Lé (2012).
Restrictions imposed on the balance sheet data
First, I only work with Commercial Banks, Savings Banks, Cooperative Banks,
Real Estate & Mortgage Bank, Islamic Banks and Other Non Banking Credit
Institution: these are the ﬁnancial institutions which are concerned by such
an insurance scheme.49 Second, BankScope indicates whether the data come
from consolidated (coded as C1 and C2 ) or unconsolidated accounts (coded
as U1 and U2 ). When a bank reports both consolidated and unconsolidated
accounts in the sample, I keep only the unconsolidated entries to avoid double
counting. The rationale for this choice is based on the observation that de-
posit insurance is generally provided by the host country to the subsidiaries
operating in this country.
Furthermore, I exclude from the sample: banks that report less than ﬁve
observations, and countries with less than ﬁfty observations. Last, I also deal
with the presence of several observations for a speciﬁc bank during a given
ﬁscal year and the fact that some observations are reported during the ﬁscal
year and not at the end of the ﬁscal year. The exact procedure implemented
is described in the appendix A and additional information about BankScope
can be found in Duprey and Lé (2012).
49The literature generally uses only the three first types of banks, but after looking in
detail at the list of banks participating to the deposit insurance scheme in some countries,
I note that the three last types of bank are very often members of the deposit insurance
funds.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, I present the additional robustness checks that have not
been include in the paper for the sake of brevity
Placebo analysis
To complement the falsiﬁcation test presented previously, I perform a placebo
analysis to exclude any possibility of capturing pre-existing upward shift in
risk-taking rather than the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption. The idea is
to simulate “false” deposit insurance adoption before the true one. If these
placebo laws exhibit positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, it would raise doubts
about the causality of the eﬀect observed in the baseline speciﬁcation. This
complement the falsiﬁcation test conducted before.
For this purpose I restrict the sample to the years preceding the true
adoption and for each country I simulate deposit insurance adoption for each
year before the true adoption. Recall that tˆj is deﬁned as the year in which
a (true) deposit insurance has been implemented in country j. Our placebo
dummy variables are deﬁned as follow :
DI
P lacebo year k
j,t =
{
1 if t ≧ tˆj − k
0 if t < tˆj − k
for 3 ≤ k ≤
Note there is no placebo dummy variables for the two year immediately
preceding adoption, because we need at least two periods after adoption for
a correct identiﬁcation. Results concerning these placebo laws can be found
in table 21. I only report results for the Capital-to-Assets ratio but results
are similar for the log of z-score. As expected, none of these placebo laws
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero except the last one but in this case the
coeﬃcients have the wrong sign: leverage appears to be decreasing. Above
all, compared with the true deposit insurance dummy, the magnitude of these
eﬀects is much smaller (from 30% to 90% lower than the true eﬀect). That is
to say, we cannot capture any signiﬁcant change in bank leverage during the
period preceding deposit insurance adoption. This sensitivity test entirely
conﬁrm that reverse causality is unlikely to be an important issue.
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Various log of z-score’s
Note that when using the z-score in a time-varying framework, there is an
important issue to discuss: the way to compute the mean and the standard
deviation of ROAAt. There is no clear consensus about this issue. Lepetit
and Strobel (2011) compares the various time-varying z-score used in the
literature. They conclude that, while appealing the use of time-varying stan-
dard deviation of ROAAt is not the best way to compute the z-score. They
also suggest to use the mean of ROAAt computed over the full period of anal-
ysis. However, they remark that contemporaneous value of ROAAt provides
almost the same results. Here I use the contemporaneous value of ROAAt
and a standard deviation of ROAAt computed over the full sample.
To conﬁrm that the results are not aﬀected by the way I choose to con-
struct the z-score, I provide results using alternative z-score. In table 22, I
present results for the log of z-score in which the Capital-to-Assets Ratio and
the Return on Average Asset are computed using a moving average with two
lags and two leads. I also report results for regression using a log of z-score
in which the standard deviation of the Return on Average Asset is computed
as the absolute deviation from the average returns (Nicolò et al. (2007) and
Lepetit and Strobel (2011)) :
σ(ROAAi,t) =| ROAAi,t −
∑
tROAAi,t
T
|
In addition, to conﬁrm that the main conclusions are not related to the
log transformation, I re-run various regressions implemented in this paper
using the z-score itself. The results can be found in table 23.
The z-score replication conﬁrms entirely the previously established re-
sults. However note that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is dramatically
reduced when including country-speciﬁc trends. Concerning the coeﬃcients
from the regressions using alternative log of z-score, they are all highly sig-
niﬁcant and their magnitude is virtually similar. The main conclusions sup-
ported by this paper are thus independent from the way the z-score is com-
puted.
Different samples
To make sure that the results established previously are not driven by some
unobserved features of the main sample, I also run regressions using three
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distinct sub-samples.50
First, a sub-sample restricted to the publicly listed banks is derived from
the original sample. Generally, listed banks provide more reliable balance-
sheet data. They also form a relatively more homogeneous group of banks
across countries what should improve quality of estimations. Finally, we
could also conjecture that these banks are more monitored and hence market
discipline is likely to be more eﬀective for these banks. But focusing on these
banks sensibly reduces the number of observations.
The second sub-sample addresses the issue of failed banks. A lot of pa-
pers has emphasized that BankScope may be subject to a survivorship bias,
namely the fact that the Bureau van Dijk deletes historical information on
banks that no longer exist in the latest release of this database (Gropp and
Heider (2010)). However, the BankScope version used in this paper seems
to be free from this survivorship bias.51 While many researchers desire to
be sure that their results are not aﬀected by this survivorship bias, I face
here the opposite issue: I want to make sure that the increase in risk-taking
that I capture is not driven by some very risky banks that eventually went
bankrupt. To address this issue, I restrict the sample to active banks in 2007,
i.e. banks reporting information in 2007.52 Consequently, all the banks that
went bankrupt before this date are not include in the sample.
The third sub-sample just considers the possibility that the results are
strongly driven by the end of the sample including the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial
crisis. Hence, I drop the years after 2007.
The results are shown in tables 24 and 25. The adverse eﬀect of introduc-
ing a deposit insurance system is largely conﬁrmed when using these three
samples. The increase in risk-taking after adopting depositors protection
fund remains statistically and economically signiﬁcant in both sub-samples.
The magnitude of the eﬀect of deposit insurance is roughly unchanged. It
is even slightly more pronounced in the case of listed banks. This observa-
tion is not surprising. We have supposed that these banks are more likely
to face market discipline. Thus, they beneﬁt more from relaxation of market
50For all these distinct samples the same restrictions as before are applied.
51For instance, AmTrade International Bank of Georgia failed in 2002 and the
FDIC was unable to arrange a transfer of its deposits to another financial institu-
tion (http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/amtrade.html). However, the balance
sheets (up to 2002) of this bank are reported in BankScope and appears in the main
sample.
52I choose the year 2007 to avoid the 2007-2009 financial crisis
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discipline induced by deposit insurance.
Finally, note that I replicate the baseline regression after having dropped
each countries from the main sample one after one. This aims to conﬁrm
that the results are not driven by a single country. In these 116 regressions,
the main ﬁnding is always conﬁrmed.53
Mergers and Acquisitions
The study of banking industry must deal with an important issue: the merg-
ers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions may induce large artiﬁcial
changes in balance sheets provided by BankScope. Especially, large varia-
tions in the Capital-to-Assets ratio are likely to be observed after M&A. With
respect to the question studied in this paper, M&A may bias the previous
results if these artiﬁcial changes in the Capital-to-Assets ratio are correlated
in some way with deposit insurance adoption. I tackle this issue by removing
from the sample banks having a growth of asset by more than 50%. These
results are displayed in table 26.
It appears that controlling explicitly for a potential bias due to M&A
leaves the main ﬁndings totally unchanged.
Additional control variables
Finally, I replicate the baseline regressions (with and without linear or quadratic
country-speciﬁc trends) and I include additional control variables at the
bank-level. As explained before, including these variables may induce strong
endogeneity issue, notably because these variables are likely to be aﬀected
by deposit insurance adoption. Even after including the bank-speciﬁc covari-
ates, the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption remains, as it can
be seen in table 27.
53Results available upon request
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Tables and Figures
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Note: These figures show the kernel density of theCapital-to-Assets ratio (top) and the
log of z-score (bottom) before (in blue) and after (in white) deposit insurance adoption.
The sample of banks is restricted to banks for which we have observations before and
after deposit insurance adoption. A lower value signals an increase in the leverage (top)/
probability of default (bottom).
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Figure 3
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Note: These figures show the distribution of the difference between the average Capital-
to-Assets ratio (top) and log of z-score (bottom) computed after and before deposit
insurance adoption. The sample of banks is restricted to banks for which we have obser-
vations before and after deposit insurance adoption. A negative value indicates that the
averageCapital-to-Assets ratio (top)/log of z-score (bottom) is lower after adoption.
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Table 21: Placebo Laws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
HHI index on deposit 0.0469** 0.0464** 0.0472** 0.0480** 0.0454**
(0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0034)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.1011* 0.1025* 0.1003* 0.0984* 0.0858
(0.0326) (0.0299) (0.0330) (0.0376) (0.0729)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.1332) (0.1380) (0.1317) (0.1445) (0.1538)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0952* -0.0963* -0.0983** -0.0962* -0.0893*
(0.0134) (0.0112) (0.0098) (0.0123) (0.0202)
Placebo for year -3 -0.0051 -0.0026
(0.2379) (0.5428)
Placebo for year -4 -0.0052 -0.0024
(0.2532) (0.5901)
Placebo for year -5 -0.0017 0.0017
(0.7267) (0.7244)
Placebo for year -6 0.0082 0.0082
(0.1179) (0.1327)
Placebo for year -7 0.0198** 0.0158**
(0.0000) (0.0008)
Observations 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923
Number of id 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755
Adjusted R-squared 0.0203 0.0415 0.0202 0.0415 0.0194 0.0414 0.0208 0.0428 0.0276 0.0464
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In all the regression the dependent variable is the Capital-to-Assets ratio. Placebo for year -"i" is a dummy variable simulating
for each country a deposit insurance adoption n years before the true adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses.
Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank
fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 22: Various log of z-score
CAR Contemporaneous Contemporaneous Mov. Av. (2 1 2) Contemporaneous Contemporaneous
ROOA Contemporaneous Mov. Av. (2 1 2) Mov. Av. (2 1 2) Sample Av. Contemporaneous
Stand. dev. ROAA Sample Av. Sample Av. Sample Av. Sample Av. Instantaneous
Deposit Insurance -0.1924*** -0.1780*** -0.1434*** -0.1724*** -0.1031***
(0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0392)
HHI index on deposit -0.0889* -0.0681 -0.0489 -0.0990** -0.5035***
(0.0518) (0.0514) (0.0469) (0.0494) (0.0938)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.4881*** 0.4443*** 0.7217*** 0.1918** 1.1979***
(0.0873) (0.0859) (0.0746) (0.0760) (0.2178)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Log of GDP per capita 0.1110** 0.1018** 0.0849* -0.0200 0.7022***
(0.0488) (0.0478) (0.0452) (0.0409) (0.0843)
Observations 205,583 206,433 206,723 206,798 205,585
Number of id 18,814 18,814 18,814 18,812 18,816
Adjusted R-squared 0.0195 0.0182 0.0260 0.0159 0.0094
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In all the column the dependent variable is the logarithm of z-score. The lines CAR, ROAA and Stand. dev. ROAA indicates
how each of the z-score component is computed. Mov Av. (2 1 2) means Moving Average with a window centered around the contemporaneous
value and including two lags and two leads. Sample Av. means average computed for each bank over the entire sample. Instantaneous ROAA reefers
to the difference between contemporaneous value of ROAA and the bank sample average of ROAA. Standard errors clustered at the country level.
p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account
the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 23: z-score regressions
z-score
Deposit Insurance -5.1099** -4.4356** -1.4799* -1.4841* -1.3681* -1.4484*
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0422) (0.0230) (0.0150) (0.0169)
HHI index on deposit 0.6840 2.6357 0.6204
(0.7949) (0.1001) (0.6052)
GDP growth (annual %) 24.3423 -6.0878 -7.0794
(0.2607) (0.3754) (0.3289)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0000
(0.4369) (0.2167) (0.9192)
Log of GDP per capita -5.2500 3.3967 -2.8447
(0.0840) (0.4037) (0.3409)
Observations 206,534 206,534 206,534 206,534 206,534 206,534
Number of id 18,815 18,815 18,815 18,815 18,815 18,815
Adjusted R-squared 0.0223 0.0237 0.0661 0.0662 0.0704 0.0706
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trend Linear Linear Lin. & Quad Lin. & Quad
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In all the regression the dependent variable is the z-score. Standard errors clustered
at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a
constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects
to the explained variance.
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Table 24: Sample of Listed Banks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0186* -0.0202* -0.1748** -0.2067** -0.0251** -0.0260** -0.1607* -0.1749**
(0.0329) (0.0131) (0.0066) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0185) (0.0039)
HHI index on deposit -0.0159 -0.2432 0.0020 -0.0188
(0.5667) (0.3098) (0.9228) (0.9239)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0687 0.8574* -0.0262 -0.0252
(0.0776) (0.0110) (0.4185) (0.9217)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.5582) (0.1188) (0.5485) (0.9259)
Log of GDP per capita 0.0095 0.2270 0.0316 0.9852**
(0.7704) (0.2947) (0.4172) (0.0003)
Observations 10,823 10,823 10,650 10,650 10,823 10,823 10,650 10,650
Adjusted R-squared 0.0138 0.0154 0.0195 0.0287 0.1243 0.1244 0.1230 0.1303
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Number of id 904 904 902 902 904 904 902 902
Ctry Specific Trend None None None None Linear Linear Linear Linear
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. This table presents results from regressions on the sample of banks publicly listed. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into
account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
10
O
N
L
IN
E
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
[F
O
R
O
N
L
IN
E
P
U
B
L
IC
A
T
IO
N
O
N
L
Y
]
79
Table 25: Sample of Banks Active in 2007 and Sample Excluding Years Post-2007
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0232* -0.1491** -0.0182* -0.1790** -0.0246** -0.2011** -0.0171** -0.1677**
(0.0115) (0.0046) (0.0223) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0189 0.0032 0.0063 -0.0520
(0.2827) (0.9817) (0.5777) (0.5039)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0324 0.4411 0.0643* 0.6194*
(0.6601) (0.4253) (0.0287) (0.0447)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.6758) (0.9208) (0.2833)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0268 0.1720 -0.1023** -0.4178**
(0.0966) (0.1654) (0.0000) (0.0030)
Observations 177,843 176,853 177,843 176,853 151,342 150,419 151,342 150,419
Number of id 15,164 15,164 15,164 15,164 18,825 18,809 18,825 18,809
Adjusted R-squared 0.0055 0.0206 0.0067 0.0219 0.0045 0.0149 0.0103 0.0176
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The columns 1 to 4 present the results from regressions on the sample of banks that have an observation in 2007. It thus
excludes all the banks that went bankrupt before 2007. The columns 5 to 8 present the results from regressions on the sample excluding years after
2007. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term.
The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 26: Controlling for M&A
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0215** -0.1746** -0.0180* -0.1890**
(0.0052) (0.0001) (0.0107) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0042 -0.1096
(0.7369) (0.2823)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0179 0.4902
(0.7723) (0.3084)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.7427) (0.3030)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0320* 0.1234
(0.0349) (0.2948)
Observations 204,337 202,898 204,337 202,898
Number of id 18,545 18,534 18,545 18,534
Adjusted R-squared 0.0055 0.0186 0.0067 0.0200
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. This table presents the results from regressions on the sample excluding bank
observations having a growth of assets higher than 50% from one year to another. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions
includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank
fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 27: Speciﬁcation with bank-speciﬁc covariates
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0205** -0.1887** -0.0200** -0.1412** -0.0166* -0.1181**
(0.0029) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0002) (0.0206) (0.0007)
Cost To Income Ratio 0.0382** 0.0433 0.0387** 0.0469 0.0388** 0.0484
(0.0000) (0.4504) (0.0000) (0.3892) (0.0000) (0.3685)
Net Interest Margin 0.1981* 1.5741* 0.1886* 1.4678* 0.1964* 1.5279*
(0.0301) (0.0263) (0.0327) (0.0305) (0.0220) (0.0197)
Total deposits/liabilities -0.0302* 0.0083 -0.0361* -0.0369 -0.0349* -0.0259
(0.0500) (0.8868) (0.0150) (0.5232) (0.0172) (0.6447)
Liquid asset/asset 0.0475 0.1233 0.0463 0.1030 0.0464 0.1000
(0.0759) (0.2408) (0.1053) (0.3762) (0.1097) (0.4000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0035 -0.0625 0.0159 0.0847 0.0150 0.0852
(0.8211) (0.5602) (0.2213) (0.2757) (0.2700) (0.2475)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0032 0.5059 -0.0634 -0.2599 -0.0464 -0.2073
(0.9493) (0.2804) (0.1154) (0.3397) (0.2497) (0.4305)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
(0.7413) (0.4064) (0.7825) (0.4701) (0.3264) (0.1481)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0260 0.1340 -0.0261 0.3168 -0.0677 -0.0126
(0.1583) (0.3031) (0.4848) (0.1359) (0.1283) (0.9526)
Observations 204,53 203,729 204,530 203,729 204,530 203,729
Number of id 18,726 18,722 18,726 18,722 18,726 18,722
Adjusted R-squared 0.0966 0.0334 0.1130 0.0663 0.1186 0.0756
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trend None None Linear Linear Lin.& Quad. Lin.& Quad.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. These regressions include bank-specific covariates taken from BankScope. Standard
errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions
includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank
fixed effects to the explained variance.
